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INTRODUCTION
During the past three decades, the study of social movements has
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become a major area of social science research in both America and
Continental Europe. As is often true, a different approach has been
adopted in these two places, so that, in effect, there are two separate
literatures on the subject. But the gap between American and Conti-
nental social movement literature is now widely recognized by soci-
ologists and political scientists within the field, and, having been so
noted, is being overcome by scholars who recognize the value to be
gained from incorporating differing perspectives in their own re-
search.' The subject matter of this Article is another gap, one that has
been much less widely noted and less often bridged. This is the gap
between legal scholarship and the social movement literature as a
whole. As discussed below in Part I, these two fields display consider-
able overlap in both their subject matter and their methodology; they
study the same phenomena and draw on the same theoretical sources
in doing so. Yet, they communicate only fitfully, if at all, with one an-
other. The social movement literature, although it pays some atten-
tion to law, makes little use of legal scholarship. In turn, and of more
direct concern for present purposes, legal scholars seem largely
oblivious to the extensive social science literature on social move-
ments. Apparently, the narrow university paths that separate law
schools from social science buildings are harder to cross than the At-
lantic Ocean; the language barrier between legal and social science
discourse is higher than the one between English and French, Ger-
man or Italian; and the sense of foreignness that afflicts legal scholars
and social scientists who belong to the same university, share the same
political views, and live in the same neighborhoods is greater than that
which divides inhabitants of different continents.
Part of this divergence between legal and social movements schol-
arship can be attributed to methodology; while the two fields draw on
the same sources, they make use of them in distinctly different ways.
A more important source of the divergence, however, is subject mat-
ter. While social movement and legal scholars study essentially the
same phenomena, they restrict themselves to different parts of these
phenomena. In particular, and as Part I discusses, social movement
scholars study the way these movements are formed, organized, and
operated, while legal scholars study the movements' specific effect on
the decisions of courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. Each
field has its own reasons for the emphasis that it adopts. In the case of
See infra Part 1.B (demonstrating how scholars from each tradition have incorpo-
rated ideas and methodologies from the other tradition).
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legal scholarship, the reasons are its essentially prescriptive stance
and, more importantly, its unity of discourse with the judiciary, which
creates a mentality that tends to assimilate the style of legal analysis to
arguments before a court. The result, as Part III discusses, is that legal
scholarship observes and analyzes the influence and impact of social
movements, but tends to ignore their origins. The theme of this Arti-
cle, and this Symposium, is that legal scholars have much to gain from
broadening their perspective and making contact with the social
movements literature. They would be able to improve their descrip-
tions of the legal system, and would perceive additional distinctions
that would enhance their prescriptions as well. Part V shows that they
would acquire, in addition, a new approach for understanding the
origin and meaning of basic legal concepts.
No effort will be made in this Article to define the term "social
movement," any more than to define the term "law." The topic of the
Article is not social movements as such, but the field of social move-
ments scholarship. That field, being a self-conscious enterprise, effec-
tively defines itself, just as legal scholarship defines itself without an
agreed-upon definition of law. For purposes of clarification, however,
the concept of a social movement can be demarcated by referring to
the familiar idea that society consists of three spheres-the political,
the economic, and the social.2 Each is capable of generating pro-
The distinction between the political and economic spheres goes back at least as
far as Aristotle, who distinguished between the polis, or city-state (the origin of our
term "political"), and the oikos, or household (the origin of our term "economic").
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: BOOKS I AND II 53-164 (Trevor J. Saunders ed., T.A. Sinclair
trans., rev. ed. 1981). Certainly, it was clearly established by the time of Adam Smith.
See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (David Campbell Publishers 1991) (1776)
(studying the causes of increases in a nation's wealth and considering the real wealth
to be found in consumer goods). The concept of civil society probably originated with
Hegel. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 122-55 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1967) (1821). As Hegel uses this term, however, it is one of the three divisions of
ethical life (Sittlichkeit), the others being the family and the state, and includes within it
things that we now associate with the political realm, such as the police and the ad-
ministration of justice. For a discussion of Hegel's conception of Sittlichkeit, see
FREDERICK NEUHOUSER, FOUNDATIONS OF HEGEL'S SOCIAL THEORY 114-44 (2000); and
CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 365-88 (1975). The contemporary taxonomy is derived from
the work of Talcott Parsons in the American tradition, see TALCOTr PARSONS, POLITICS
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1969) (setting forth the components of society and their in-
terrelations); TALCOTr PARSONS, THE SYSTEM OF MODERN SOCIETIES (1971) (arguing
that modern society emerged in the West), and Antonio Gramsci in the Continental
tradition, see ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Joseph A. Buttigieg ed., Joseph
A. Buttigieg & Antonio Callari trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1992) (discussing political
systems and problems of history, culture, philosophy, and civil society). While the
concept has become less prominent in the United States with the decline of Parsonian
20011
4 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW
grammatic initiatives of various sorts. The political sphere produces
legislation, court decisions, and actions by administrative agencies.
The economic sphere generates goods and services, typically through
the modality of profit-making enterprises. The social sphere, also de-
scribed as civil society, is the source of religious activity, fraternal or-
ganizations, and a variety of fads and fashions. Social movements be-
long to this third sphere of society. They can be regarded as
coordinated, ideologically based efforts that originate within the social
sphere or, in other words, as a self-conscious effort by previously un-
organized individuals resulting in collective action.
The prevailing view is that organizations or political parties are
not the same as social movements. Rather, social movements are re-
garded as consisting of more diffuse agglomerations of individuals
within civil society who are linked together by ideology, beliefs, or col-
lective identities. Organizations may catalyze the creation of these ag-
glomerations, or may be generated by them; in most cases, the rela-
tionship is probably co-causal.4  On occasion, these agglomerations
sociology, it remains central in much of Continental social thought. See, e.g., JURGEN
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Bur-
ger trans., 1989) (1962) (examining the bourgeois public sphere through a liberal
model that studies a transformation in the classic form of the public and private dis-
tinction); 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION]
(exploring approaches to the problem of rationality and preserving the distinction be-
tween the public and private spheres); NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Bed-
narz & Dirk Baecker trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1995) (1984) [hereinafter LUHMANN,
SOCIAL SYSTEMS] (viewing modern society as a complex system of communications
composed of subsystems with unique perspectives); NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE
DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (Stephen Holmes & Charles Larmore trans., 1982)
(studying modern society by way of a social differentiation approach); CLAUS OFFE,
DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM (John Keane ed., 1985) (exploring the relationship be-
tween political power and authority and social authority). Fo? general discussions of
the concept, see NORBERTO BOBBIO, THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY (Richard Bellamy
ed., Roger Griffin trans., 1987);JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND
POLITICAL THEORY (1992); ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY (1992);
Charles Taylor, Modes of Civil Society, 3 PUB. CULTURE 95 (1990); Michael Walzer, The
Idea of Civil Society, DISSENT, Spring 1991, at 293.See COHEN & ARATO, supra note 2, at 492-563 (exploring the relationship be-
tween social movements, collective action, and civil society by looking at the "resource-
mobilization" paradigm and the "identity-oriented" paradigm).
4 See DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN
INTRODUCTION 16-19 (1999) (discussing the relationship and differences between so-
cial movements and political or religious organizations); John D. McCarthy & Mayer N.
Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. Soc. 1212,
1218 (1977) (defining a social movement organization as a "complex, or formal, or-
ganization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a coun-
termovement and attempts to implement those goals"), reprinted in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
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will even generate a political party, although they are more likely to
ally themselves with an existing one. The movement itself exists in
the social sphere, however, while the organizations that created it or
were created by it bridge the social and political spheres, translating
the beliefs of the movement's participants into political action. Of
course, the boundary between the spheres is entirely permeable, and
it may be difficult to assign specific actions or events to one side or the
other. The entire model is best treated as a heuristic, as a device for
identifying and conceptualizing complex sociopolitical processes,
rather than as a definitive explanation.6
I. OVERLAPS
A. Subject Matter
One event that catalyzed the modern social movement literature,
in both the United States and Continental Europe, was the advent of
environmentalism.7 Here was a rapid shift in social attitudes, wide-
IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 15, 20 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds.,
1987).
5 See HERBERT KITSCHELT, THE LoGics OF PARTY FORMATION: ECOLOGICAL
POLITICS IN BELGIUM AND WEST GERMANY (1989) (examining the formation of Belgian
and West German ecology parties such as the Green, Ecolo, and Agalev parties);
PHILIP LOWE &JANE GOYDER, ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS IN POLITICS (1983) (exploring
the relationship of the environmental movement to the political system).6 But see AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 2 (Gunther
Teubner ed., 1988) (examining "the potential of autopoiesis for legal theory and ...
reformulat[ing] fundamental legal concepts in light of this theory"); LUIIMANN,
SOCIAL SYSTEMS, sulra note 2 (presenting a theory of society based on self-referential,
"autopoietic" systems); GUNTIER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Zenon
Bankowski ed., Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., 1993) (asserting that law is an
autopoietic system, which reproduces itself). Luhmann and Teubner regard the po-
litical, economic, and social systems, as well as the legal subsystem, as independent
realms that are defined by distinctive, self-sustaining discursive practices, and that in-
teract with each other only when each realm translates outside events into its own dis-
course.
7 See generally RUSSELLJ. DALTON, THE GREEN RAINBOW: ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
IN WESTERN EUROPE (1994) (exploring the effects that environmental interest groups
have on the political process through the groups' creation of a force for change to so-
ciety's new policy interests); MARIO DIANI, GREEN NETWORKS: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
OF THE ITALIAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1995) (examining the social movement
from a structural approach that focuses on the exchanges between organizations and
individuals that create and shape the movement); ECOLOGICAL RESISTANCE
MOVEMENTS (Bron Raymond Taylor ed., 1995) (describing the emergence, structure,
and impact of popular ecological resistance movements through social movement the-
ory); ANDREW JAMISON ET AL., THE MAKING OF THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSCIOUSNESS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN
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spread in its appeal, sustained in its operation, and profound in its ef-
fects, that contradicted all existing theories on the causes of mass
movements. It neither seemed to arise from social frustration, dislo-
cation, or anomie, nor express itself as either a series of spontaneous
popular uprisings or as a blind obedience to demagoguery,8 nor con-
SWEDEN, DENMARK AND THE NETHERLANDS (1990) (studying, in a comparative man-
ner, the development of environmental groups in order to bridge the gap between
ideological and empirical analysis of social movements literature); GRANT JORDAN &
WILLIAM MALONEY, THE PROTEST BUSINESS? MOBILIZING CAMPAIGN GROUPS (1997)
(examining Friends of the Earth and Amnesty International in Britain but concluding
that social movement literature adds little to the traditional political science ap-
proach); LOWE & GOYDER, supra note 5 (relating the social movement, organizational,
and pressure group perspectives of environmental groups for a fuller understanding of
their workings, significance, and prospects); GARETH PORTER & JANET WELSH BROWN,
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1991) (describing the emergence, characteristics,
and political context of world environmental politics); ANDREW SzASz, ECOPOPULISM:
Toxic WASTE AND THE MOVEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1994) (examining
the circumstances leading to emergence and success of the movement concerning
hazardous waste and other toxins).
8 See, e.g., ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (Discus Avon Books 1965)
(1941) (arguing that the isolation of freedom is unbearable to people, causing anxiety
and a desire to escape freedom by submission or entrance into dependencies); TED
ROBERT GURR, WI-Y MEN REBEL (1970) (setting forth a theory of political violence in
which discontent develops, is politicized, and finally results in violent action); RUDOLF
HEBERLE, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 93
(1951) (stating that "the broad masses are likely to be activated only if their immediate
personal interests are affected by some measure taken by the government"); ERIC
HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS MOVEMENTS 11
(1951) ("For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must
be intensely discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that by the
possession of some potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they have
access to a source of irresistible power."); WILLIAM KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF
MASS SOCIETY 128 (1959) ("[M]ajor discontinuities in social process produce mass
movements by destroying pre-established intermediate relations and by preventing the
formation of new associations aligned with the social order."); GUSTAVE LE BON, The
Crowd, in THE MAN AND HIS WORKS 57 (Alice Widener ed., 1979) (1909) (explaining
that both remote and immediate factors shape the opinions and beliefs of crowds);
GEORGE RUDP, TIlE CROWD IN HISTORY, 1730-1848, at 214-36 (1964) (analyzing the
"pre-industrial" crowd and making a distinction between dominant and underlying
motives, such as economics and politics); NEIL J. SMELSER, THEORY OF COLLECTIVE
BEHAVIOR (1962) (arguing that many conditions need to come together in a specific
pattern to cause collective behavior); PETER WORSLEY, THE TRUMPET SHALL SOUND: A
STUDY OF "CARGO CULTS" IN MELANESIA (2d ed. 1968) (exploring movements in which
there are expectations and preparations for a period of "supernatural bliss"); Joseph R.
Gusfield, Mass Society and Extremist Politics, 27 AM. Soc. REV. 19 (1962) (stating that
many hypothesize that social movements are the product of social change); Joseph R.
Gusfield, The Study of Social Movements, in 14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 440 (David L. Sills ed., 1968) (noting that some social movements
entail "the emotional-affectual 'following' of a charismatic leader" by its members).
Underlying this literature are a disparagement and fear of mass movements as the op-
posite of the reasoning and deliberation that was, and still is, associated with democ-
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stitute an emergent collective behavior resulting from individual reac-
tions. ' Indeed, the movement was remarkable for the diffuse and re-
mote character of the concerns that animated its participants, for the
lack of any particularized economic interests in its basic goals, and for
the sophisticated organizational efforts that sustained it. For some
reason, large numbers of people who were otherwise indistinguishable
from the general population were moved to political action by incre-
mental deterioration of the air that everybody breathed and the water
everybody drank, the degradation of wilderness areas that they would
never visit, and by the extinction in the wild of species that they would
see only in zoos or picture books. By some mechanism, the environ-
mental movement was able to generate stable, effective organizations
racy. The participants in social movements were seen either as being out of control, or
victimized by strong emotions and thus too easily controlled by unscrupulous dema-
gogues.
9 This was the approach adopted by the Chicago School of Sociology, which de-
scribed its methodology as symbolic interactionism. See HADLEY CANTRIL, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (4th ed. 1967) (explaining behavior as a function
of the environment and the person's predispositions at that moment); KURT LANG &
GLADYS ENGEL LANG, COLLECTIVE DYNAMICS 4 (1961) (describing social dynamics as
"those patterns of social action that are spontaneous and unstructured inasmuch as
they are not organized and are not reducible to social structure"); ROBERT E. PARK, ON
SOCIAL CONTROL AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR: SELECTED PAPERS 225-39 (Ralph
Turner ed., 1967) (defining collective behavior as the behavior of individuals resulting
from shared impulses that are common and collective to other members of society);
ROBERT E. PARK, THE CROWD AND THE PUBLIC AND OTHER ESSAYS 22 (Henry EisnerJr.
ed., Charlotte Eisner trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1972) (1904) (explaining the crowd as
a "psychic current, together with the individuals carried by it"); RALPH H. TURNER &
LEWIS M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 21 (1957) ("Unless there is a minimum of
cultural homogeneity and a certain 'we'-feeling in a collectivity, there will not be a suf-
ficient basis for the communication between individuals which is necessary for the de-
velopment of collective action."); Herbert Blumer, Collective Behavior, in NEW OUTLINE
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY 199 (Alfred McClung Lee ed., rev. 2d ed. 1951)
(viewing social movements as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life).
The Chicago School did integrate some of the insights of European sociologists, such
as Emile Durkheim and Georg Simmel, into the American empirical tradition, and it
struggled with the issue of socially constructed identity that would come to play an im-
portant role in the Continental social movement literature. The work of Simmel was
particularly influential in this regard. See Donald N. Levine et al., Simmel's Influence on
American Sociology (pts. 1 & 2), 81 AM.J. Soc. 813 (1975), 81 AM.J. SOC. 1112 (1976)
(tracing the three phases of Simmel's thought and its influence on theoretical orienta-
tions and research traditions). In this sense, the Chicago School can be regarded as
paving the way for the integration of the Continental and American research on social
movements. For discussions of the Chicago School, see MARTIN BULMER, THE
CHICAGO SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY: INSTITUTIONALIZATION, DIVERSITY AND THE RISE OF
SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH (1984); JAMES T. CAREY, SOCIOLOGY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS:
THE CHICAGO SCIOOL (1975); FRED H. MAT-HEWS, QUEST FOR AN AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGY: ROBERT E. PARKAND THE CHICAGO SCHOOL (1977).
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and public demonstrations that were coordinated, well-managed, non-
violent affairs.
The environmental movement was not unique in this respect. Si-
multaneously, or within a short period of time, the antinuclear and
peace movements, the animal rights movement," the prisoners'
rights movement,' 2 the anti-abortion and pro-choice movements,'1 the
direct action movement,'4 and the resurgent human rights move-
ment" all displayed these same distinctive and unexpected character-
istics. These anomalous phenomena, moreover, provided social scien-
tists with a different perspective on other movements that had
previously been understood in more conventional ways. The con-
1o See generally DAVID CORTRIGHT, PEACE WORKS: THE CITIZEN'S ROLE IN ENDING
THE COLD WAR (1993) (assessing the peace movement's influence on the end of the
Cold War through its impact on the general political climate); DAVID S. MEYER, A
WINTER OF DISCONTENT: THE NUCLEAR FREEZE AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1990) (ana-
lyzing the nuclear freeze movement's origins, development, strategies, organization,
and the political context in which it operated); TiiOMAS ROCHON, MOBILIZING FOR
PEACE: THE ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE (1988) (suggesting an
approach to studying peace movements that incorporates and expands on the new so-
cial movement theory and resource mobilization approach); WOLFGANG RUDIG, ANTI-
NUCLEAR MOVEMENTS: A WORLD SURVEY OF OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR ENERGY (1990)
(discussing the emergence and successes of the antinuclear movement); STATES AND
ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENTS (Helena Flame ed., 1994) (studying the interactions be-
tween antinuclear movements and pro-nuclear states by way of case studies).
1I See generally HAROLD D. GUITHER, ANIMAL RIGHITS: HISTORY AND SCOPE OFA
RADICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT (1998) (describing the history, scope, participants, and
current status of the animal rights movement);JAMES M.JASPER & DOROTHY NELKIN,
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS CRUSADE: THE GROWTH OFA MORAL PROTEST (1992) (exploring
the moral basis for the animal rights movement).
12 See generally BRADLEY STEWART CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL (1991)
(providing a case study of a prison reform lawsuit in Georgia and suggesting ways in
which judges can become more effective in their capacity to intervene in prison reform
litigation); STEVJ. MARTIN & SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, TEXAS PRISONS (1987) (pre-
senting a history of prison reform activities in Texas); JIM THOMAS, PRISONER
LITIGATION (1988) (offering a social history of prisoner litigation).
1. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
(1984) (exploring the ways in which people establish conflicting views on abortion);
SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM
IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT (1991) (detailing the course of the pro-choice movement
and the growth, maintenance, decline, and role of social movements generally in the
political system).
14 See generally BARBARA EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PROTEST AND CULTURAL REVOLUTION:
NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION IN THE 1970S AND 1980S (1991) (examining the direct
action movement from an insider's perspective).
15 See generally LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGiHITS (1990) (collecting essays ad-
dressing the implications of the internationalization of human rights); WARREN LEE
HOLLEMAN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1987) (examining the Western values
and theological perspectives embedded in the human rights movement).
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sumer movement, the welfare rights movement, the farm worker
movement, the civil rights, women's rights, and gay rights movements
could easily have all been regarded as expressions of direct self-
interest, and as spontaneous, emotive uprisings. Having grappled
with the ideological and well-organized character of environmental-
ism and its compatriots, however, social scientists were able to per-
ceive the ideology and organization that motivated the members of
these more familiar efforts."' Most simply, they recognized that the
16 See, e.g., BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (1987)
(tracing the roots of the gay and lesbian movement through a "political process"
model that takes explanations beyond an inexplicable evolution of ideas or events);
RUFUS P. BROWNING ET AL., PROTEST Is NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF BLACKS AND
HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS (1984) (approaching minority mobiliza-
tion through a theory of political incorporation in which members work to become
part of liberal political coalitions); DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991) (presenting a theoretical study of the dynamics of public-
spirited collective action and of the civil rights movement and the local and national
politics that surrounded it); GARY DELGADO, ORGANIZING THE MOVEMENT: THE
ROOTS AND GROWTH OF ACORN (1986) (discussing ACORN, a poor person's move-
ment directed at banking practices, and its effectiveness due to its organizing drive);
JOHN D'EMILIO, MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS AND THE
UNIVERSITY (1992) (surveying the gay rights movement and arguing that gay rights
groups are complex and intricate organizations); SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS:
THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW
LEFT (1980) (depicting how women's experiences in the civil rights movement and
New Left and the ideology of those movements spurred a feminist consciousness of
equality); FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS: HARVEST OF TIE NEW WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
(Myra Marx Ferree & Patricia Yancey Martin eds., 1995) (exploring the relationship of
feminist organizations to the women's rights movement and how they provide the
movement with an agenda and purpose and receive, in turn, resources and a suppor-
tive context); SUSAN HANDLEY HERTZ, THE WELFARE MOTHERS MOVEMENT: A DECADE
OF CHANGE FOR POOR WOMEN? (1981) (studying the welfare mothers movement from
the perspective of the women themselves and concluding that most members were re-
cruited by canvassing and media attention and that success was due, in part, to opposi-
tion, which increases the commitment of members); CRAIG JENKINS, THE POLITICS OF
INSURGENCY: THE FARM WORKER MOVEMENT IN THE 1960S (1985) (analyzing the
United Farm Worker movement as exemplifying the basic goals and strategies of the
social movements of the 1960s); ETHEL KLEIN, GENDER POLITICS (1984) (addressing
how women developed a "group consciousness" that enabled political action);JANEJ.
MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986) (describing the forces of inclusivity and
exclusivity that held the women's rights movement together); ROBERT N. MAYER, THE
CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE MARKETPLACE 32 (1989) ("The fullest ex-
planation of the cause of consumerism combines underlying social conditions with re-
source mobilization by effective political entrepreneurs."); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL
PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 2 (1982) (argu-
ing that "the emergence of widespread protest activity is the result of a combination of
expanding political opportunities and indigenous organization, as mediated through a
crucial process of collective attribution"); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984) (in-
vestigating the unfolding of the civil rights movement and demonstrating the impor-
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consumer and welfare rights movements were often spearheaded by
middle-class individuals who were not the movements' principal bene-
ficiaries, that the civil rights movement included many whites, the
women's movement many men, and the gay rights movement many
straights. At a deeper level, they perceived, and were willing to take
seriously, the desire of these movements to effect larger social trans-
formations that were more closely linked to their members' beliefs
than to their interests or immediate dissatisfactions.17
The overlap between the subject matter of this social movement
literature and legal scholarship is immediately apparent, and was per-
tance of internal organization and African-American institutions, such as the church);
FRANCIS PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY
SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL (1979) (suggesting that lower classes became historical ac-
tors, not merely victims, through the poor people's movements); SASHA ROSENEIL,
DISARMING PATRIARCHY (1995) (arguing for the integration of micro-level mobilization
and macro-level social change in studying the emergence of social movements); THE
WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE:
CONSCIOUSNESS, POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (Mary Fainsod Katzen-
stein & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS]
(arguing that a feminist consciousness is central to the success of feminist movements).
Even in cases where the direct economic stakes were readily apparent, scholars began
to reinterpret interest groups and localized protests as social movements. See, e.g.,JANE
CAMPBELL & MIKE OLIVER, DISABILITY POLITICS: UNDERSTANDING OUR PAST,
CHANGING OUR FUTURE 23 (1996) (describing the British disability movement as a
"new social movement in that it is beginning to offer disabled people a democratic and
political voice"); EDWARD J. WALSH, DEMOCRACY IN THE SHADOWS: CITIZEN
MOBILIZATION IN THE WAKE OF THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND (1988) (utilizing
social movement theory and, in particular, "frame alignment" to analyze social re-
sponses to the Three Mile Island disaster); Josh Gamson, Silence, Death, and the Invisible
Enemy: AIDS Activism and Social Movement "Newness", 36 Soc. PROBS. 351 (1989) (ana-
lyzing AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACTUP), an AIDS activist movement, and
noting that it shares many of the characteristics of new social movements); Richard K.
Scotch, Disability as the Basis for a Social Movement: Advocacy and the Politics of Definition,
44J. SOC. ISSUES 159 (1988) (discussing how barriers were overcome in the formation
of a social movement of disabled people).
17 In this area, Charles Tilly's work, arguing that social protest and revolution were
not correlated with economic conditions, was influential. See EDWARD SHORTER &
CHARLES TILLY, STRIKES IN FRANCE 1830 TO 1968 (1974) (portraying strikes in France
as an instrument of working-class political action linked to changes in social structure
and political participation); CHARLES TILLY, THE CONTENTIOUS FRENCH (1986) (exam-
ining how the contentions of the French people were changed by the development of
capitalism and the concentration of power in the national state); Charles Tilly, Food
Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe, in THE FORMATION OF NATION STATES IN
WESTERN EUROPE 380 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975) (discussing the political importance of
food rioters, whose treatment by European governments influenced their ability to
achieve other objectives); cf CHARLES TILLY, AS SOCIOLOGY MEETS HISTORY 215 (1981)
(discussing methodologies for studying how the Western "growth of national states and
the development of capitalism interacted to alter the ways in which ordinary people
banded together to act on their interest").
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ceptively described in Joel Handler's 1978 book, Social Movements and
the Legal System.'8 Handler discusses four major areas: environmental-
ism; consumer protection; civil rights; and social welfare. All these ar-
eas featured social movements that included, as a central aspect of
their program, the creation of new laws or the reform of existing ones.
These new laws and law revisions, moreover, had direct effects on the
legal academy. The laws that were direct creations of the environ-
mental movement, for example, became the subject of a new, highly
popular course, and of a burgeoning field of scholarship.
19 Handler's
other areas of interest were also fecund sources of legislation, legal
scholarship, and law school courses, as were a wide variety of other so-
cial movements, including women's rights, gay rights, and disability
rights. Older law school subjects, such as labor law, antitrust, and civil
rights, bear the imprint of earlier social movements. Even my seem-
ingly dull teaching subject, administrative law, can be regarded as the
product of the Progressive movement-a tempting thought, since it
lends the subject a sense of drama that it would not otherwise possess.
One could easily fill the remainder of this volume with a list of law re-
view articles that address laws and court decisions that have resulted in
some fashion from social movements.
This is not meant to suggest that social movements provide a
golden key for understanding law in general. Much of our legal sys-
tem is autonomously generated by the political sphere-the legisla-
ture, the courts, and, increasingly, the administrative agencies. To
this category belong large areas of commercial and regulatory law,
and virtually the whole of common law. The economic sphere also
generates legal initiatives, although probably many fewer than either
the Marxists or the public choice scholars would have us believe. The
point, though, is that the social sphere is also an important source of
law. And with the weakening of religious institutions and the increas-
ingly interactive, or democratic, nature of society, this third category
18 JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978).
19 As examples of some of the existing casebooks on environmental law, all written
since the advent of the environmental movement, see ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A.
FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (5th ed. 1999); ELIZABETH
GLASS GELTMAN, MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE (1997); 
FRANK
P. GRAD & JOEL A. MINTZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (4th ed. 2000); ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1998);
JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG, MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1999); WILLIAM
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of laws is largely the product of social movements. Thus, while social
movements are far from being the only forces that shape our legal sys-
tem, the overlap is substantial. To a significant extent, then, social
movement scholars and legal scholars are studying the same thing.
B. Methodology
Social movement literature and legal scholarship share more than
a common subject matter, however. To a surprising extent, given
their disparate intellectual origins, the two fields have approached
their common subject matter with similar methodologies. As stated at
the outset, the social movements literature was initially divided be-
tween the American and Continental approaches. " The American
approach, often described as resource mobilization, developed during
the 1970s and 1980s. It drew its initial inspiration from a 1965 work
20 See, e.g., Jean L. Cohen, Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contem-
porary Social Movements, 52 SOC. RES. 663 (1985) (comparing how the resource-
mobilization theory, the paradigm favored in the United States, and the identity-
oriented paradigm, the theoretical response common in Western Europe, determine
what is actually new in new social movements); Bruce Fireman & William A. GaInson,
Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective, in THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 8 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., Univ. Press of Am. 1988)
(1979) (criticizing the utilitarian approach to collective action for focusing too heavily
on self-interest as an explanation for mobilization and suggesting that the role of soli-
darity and principles should be examined instead in determining why people act as
they do); Introduction to CULTURAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, at vii (Marcy
Darnovsky et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CULTURAL POLITICS] (tracing the separate
developments of American and European social movement theory); Bert Klander-
mans, New Social Movements and Resource Mobilization: The European and the American Ap-
proach, 4 INT'LJ. OF MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 13 (1986) [hereinafter Klander-
mans, New Social Movements] (noting that although Europe and the United States
experienced similar growth in social movements, the two continents sought explana-
tions from different directions); Bert Klandermans, New Social Movements and Resource
Mobilization: The European and the American Approach Revisited [hereinafter Klander-
mans, New Social Movements Revisited], in RESEARCH ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE
STATE OF THE ART IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA 17 (Dieter Rucht ed., 1991)
[hereinafter RESEARCIH ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS] (comparing the European and
American approaches to explaining new social movements and reviewing new themes
that emerge after criticizing both approaches); Sidney Tarrow, Comparing Social Move-
ment Participation in Western Europe and the United States: Problems, Uses, and a Proposalfor
Synthesis, in RESEARCH ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra, at 392 (developing guidelines to
compare social movement research from the European and American schools of
thought); Louis A. Zurcher & David A. Snow, Collective Behavior: Social Movements, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 447, 448 (Morris Rosenberg &
Ralph H. Turner eds., 1981) (arguing that the study of social movements can function
as "an important bridge for understanding the relation between the individual and so-
ciety, between structure and process, and between psychology and sociology").
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by Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.' Proponents of this
approach treat the members of social movements as instrumentally ra-
tional actors, and the leaders as policy entrepreneurs who follow co-
herent organizational and political strategies. In the place of vague
generalities about collective dissatisfaction or rising expectations, they
offer detailed accounts of the way social movements are mobilized, of
the organizations that develop to sustain them, and of the movements'
strategies for achieving their political 
effects.22
The Continental approach, which dates from the 1960s, but
reached its apogee in the following two decades, emerged from the
neo-Marxist analysis of critical theory. 
2 Society, according to this view,
21 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). For Olson's influ-
ence on the American school of social movement theory, see SIDNEY TARROW, POWER
IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICS 13-16 (1994);
Carol McClurg Mueller, Building Social Movement Theory, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL
MOVEMENT THEORY 3, 6 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) [here-
inafter FRONTIERS] ("[Ilt would be difficult to overestimate the importance of [Ol-
son's] rational choice model for the development of resource mobilization and collec-
tive action theory."); and Mayer N. Zald, Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on
the Past and Future of the Resource Mobilization Research Program, in FRONTIERS, supra, at
326, 332.
22 For characteristic statements of this approach, see WILLIAM A. GAMSON, THE
STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST (2d ed. 1990); GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER,
THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY 
(1993);JOI-IN D.
MCCARTHY & MAYER N. ZALD, THE TREND OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA:
PROFESSIONALIZATION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION (1973), reprinted in 
SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at app.; ANTHONY
OBERSCHALL, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1973); SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 4; THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
supra note 20; CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBIL17ATION TO REVOLUTION (1978); and J.
Craig Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements, 9 ANN. REV.
SoC. 527 (1983).
23 See, e.g., THEODOR W. ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS (E.B. Ashton trans., 1973)
[hereinafter ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS] (giving reasons for deviating from some
aspects of Marxist thought); THEODOR W. ADORNO, THE JARGON OF AUTHENTICITY
(Knut Tarnowski & Frederic Will trans., 1973) (representing a Hegelian-Marxist re-
sponse to the existentialist rejection of critical reason); MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR
W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT John Cumming trans., Continuum
Publ'g 1987) (1972) (exploring the role of ideology in establishing and maintaining
social classes and capitalist domination); HERBERT MARCUSE, COUNTERREVOLUTION
AND REVOLT (1972) (exploring possibilities for social transformation and their rela-
tionship to ideology); HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE
IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964) (explaining that social move-
ments as envisioned by Marx and critical theory require qualitative changes in society);
FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL
SOCIALISM 1933-1944 (Harper & Row 1966) (1942) (analyzing process of control and
mobilization in Nazi Germany); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMATION (W.O. Henderson & W.H. Chaloner trans., 1957)
(reviewing the potential good and evil effects of automation on society and human
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is divided into economically based classes and dominated by an elite
that uses its leading role within the economic sphere to control the
political one. The political sphere, in turn, controls society; crucially,
however, the primary means of this control is ideological. Rather than
governmental force or economic coercion, belief systems, and the as-
serted neutrality of those belief systems, are the sinews of social con-
trol. Social reform or transformation can be achieved and, indeed,
can only be achieved, through counter-ideologies that arise from the
social sphere, the one sector not dominated by the economically
based elites. The crucial aspect of social movements, therefore, is that
they enable people to generate new ideologies and re-define their
own identities.24
The distinction between the American and Continental ap-
freedom and stressing that the goal of economic planning should be to combine
automation with a free and democratic society). The group of scholars who developed
critical theory during the 1920s and 30s were associated with the Institute of Social Re-
search, an affiliate of the University of Frankfurt, and are therefore known as the
Frankfurt School. Juirgen Habermas became associated with the Institute when it was
reconstituted after World War I1, and most of his work can be regarded as a continued
development of critical theory. See, e.g.,JORGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN
INTERESTS (JeremyJ. Shapiro trans., 1971) (1968) (undertaking a historically oriented
attempt to reconstruct the prehistory of modern positivism with the systematic inten-
tion of analyzing the connections between knowledge and human interests); JRGEN
HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1973) (applying the Marx-
ian theory of crisis to the reality of "advanced capitalism"); JORGEN HABERMAS, THEORY
AND PRACTICE (John Viertel trans., 1973); HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION, supra note 2 (presenting, in two volumes, a critical theory of modernity).
McCarthy himself takes this position. See THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY
OFJURGEN HABERMAS 136 (1978) (discussing the progression of Habermas's writings
and observing that "this rather vague conception of critical theory gradually takes on
the shape of a relatively differentiated research program"). For discussions of the
Frankfurt School, see DAVID HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THEORY:
HORKHEIMER TO HABERMAS (1980); MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A
HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 1923-
1950 (1973); ZOLTAN TAR, THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL: THE CRITICAL THEORIES OF MAX
HORKHEIMER AND THEODOR W. ADORNO (1977); ROLF WIGGERSHAUS, THE FRANKFURT
SCHOOL: ITS HISTORY, THEORIES, AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE (Michael Robertson
trans., 1994).
24 For some of the Continental works on social movements that reflect this view,
see 2 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE
(1997); 2 HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 2, at 301-403;
HANSPETER KRIESI, POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE: THE DUTCH CASE
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1993); ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT:
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (John Keane &
Paul Mier eds., Temple Univ. Press 1989) (1989); JAN PAKULSKI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
THE POLITICS OF MORAL PROTEST (1990); ALAIN TOURAINE, THE VOICE AND THE EYE:
AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Alan Duff trans., 1981); Claus Offe, New Social
Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics, 52 SOC. RES. 817 (1985).
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proaches to social movements should not, however, be overdrawn.
While the two approaches may seem distinct when one compares their
most determined members, such as McCarthy and Zald on the Ameri-
can side, 5 and Alain Touraine on the Continent,
2 ' many other schol-
ars incorporated concepts from the opposite school quite early in the
field's development, and soon began to undertake conscious, theo-
retical efforts to combine the two approaches.
27 Much of this has been
inspired by the notorious macro-micro problem of the social sciences
in general, the effort to develop explanations that link individual be-
havior to mass phenomena.
8 The unification of previously unorgan-
25 See William A. Gamson, Introduction to SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 1, 1 ("Zald and McCarthy represent 
one
major tributary to a stream of revisionist thinking on social movements generally 
re-
ferred to as 'resource mobilization' theory.").
26
See TOURAINE, supra note 24 (suggesting that the format of society is not based
on intents or circumstances but on people's actions and interactions).
27 See, e.g., CHALLENGING THE POLITICAL ORDER (Russell J. Dalton & Manfred
Kuechler eds., 1990) (comparing findings by people with different methodologies 
and
perspectives on social movements); CULTURAL POLITICS, supra note 20 (collecting es-
says originally prepared for a conference that aimed to promote discourse between 
the
new social movement and resource mobilization perspectives); DELIA PORTA & 
DIANI,
supra note 4 (contributing to the integration of the American and European 
tradi-
tions); RON EYERMAN & ANDREW JAMISON, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A COGNITIVE
APPROACH (1991) (reconciling the resource-mobilization and identity-theory ap-
proaches to the study of social movements in order to enhance understanding of 
the
field and avoid fragmentation); FRONTIERS, supra note 21 (presenting essays 
that in-
corporate a social psychology dimension to the traditional resource-mobilization 
ap-
proach); ALBERTO MELUCCI, CHALLENGING CODES (1996) (focusing on how actors 
in
social movements construct their action); SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE 
(Hank
Johnston & Bert Klandermans eds., 1995) (discussing the application of cultural 
analy-
sis to interest-oriented perspectives in the study of social movements); TARROW, supra
note 21 (presenting a theory of collective action that incorporates consideration 
of his-
torical, sociological, and political factors); Bert Klandermans & Sidney Tarrow, 
Mobili-
zation into Social Movements: Synthesizing European and American Approaches, 
in FROM
STRUCTURE TO ACTION: COMPARING SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH ACROSS CULTURES
1, 3 (Bert Klandermans et al. eds., 1988) (integrating European and American 
ap-
proaches to studying social movements and suggesting methods for achieving 
this
combination); Myra Marx Ferree & Frederick D. Miller, Mobilization and Meaning: 
70-
ward an Integration of Social Psychological and Resource Perspectives on Social Movements, 
55
SOC. INQUIRY 38 (1985) (discussing the inability of resource mobilization 
to explain
social movements without at least considering factors prominent in the motivational
theories, such as ideology).
28 SeeJAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 1-23 (1990) (describ-
ing the gap between theory and research as the former centers on the behavior 
of so-
cial systems while the latter focuses on individual behavior); THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978) (exploring the analytic work done 
in so-
cial sciences regarding the relationship and interaction between individuals' 
behavior
characteristics and the characteristics of the social aggregate to which they contribute);
Randall Collins, On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology, 86 AM. J. Soc. 984 (1981)
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ized individuals into a social movement on the basis of voluntary ac-
tion, rather than external coercion, obviously raises the macro/micro
problem in a particularly vivid way. Social movement scholars soon
became aware that the resource-mobilization approach failed to ac-
count for the motivation of these individuals, ' and that the Continen-
tal approach was equally inadequate in accounting for the mecha-
nisms by which these individuals translated their shared identities into
30political or social action. In response, they have developed several
avenues of research that attempt to unify the two approaches. One
(suggesting a method for integrating micro- and macro-level research).
See Fireman & Gamson, supra note 20 (criticizing the utilitarian approach to col-
lective action for focusing too heavily on self-interest as an explanation for mobiliza-
tion and suggesting that the role of solidarity and principles should be examined in-
stead in determining why people act as they do); William A. Gamson, The Social
Psychology of Collective Action, in FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 53 (explaining the resur-
gence of social psychology in the resource mobilization field as a means to better un-
derstand why new social movements develop); Jenkins, supra note 22, at 549 ("The fu-
ture of resource mobilization theory lies in . . . refining the basic mobilization model
by developing a more sophisticated social psychology of collective action."); Sidney
Tarrow, Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames, in FRONTIERS, supra
note 21, at 174 (suggesting that American social scientists are considering cultural val-
ues in explaining political outcomes because they are not satisfied with the results of
the American theory of social movements); Zurcher & Snow, supra note 20, at 467
(noting that "resource mobilization theorists generally give little attention to the role
of ideology, symbolization, and passion in relation to the emergence, operation, and
decline of social movements"). As Gamson states, "[s] ocial psychology bashing among
students of social movements is over." Gamson, supra, at 53.
30 See DELLA PORTA & DIANI, supra note 4, at 13 ("The main problem which [the
new social movement] approach leaves unresolved is the analysis of mechanisms which
lead from conflict to action .... "); Klandermans, New Social Movements, supra note 20,
at 13 ("The new social movement approach has concentrated on factors that deter-
mine mobilization potential, but does not give an answer to the question of how these
potentials are mobilized."); Klandermans, New Social Movements Revisited, supra note 20
(suggesting that the new social movement approach has focused too much on the
structural preconditions of movements and has neglected the importance of organiza-
tions and resources); Bert Klandermans & Dirk Oegema, Potentials, Networks, Motiva-
tions, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements, 52 AM. Soc. REV. 519
(1987) (suggesting that different theories, as well as practical efforts, are needed to
explain and create mobilization of and participation in social movements); Hanspeter
Kriesi, The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 152 (Doug McAdam et al. eds.,
1996) (indicating that although the features of a political system are important in
shaping new social movements, factors such as a group's internal structure and com-
munications cannot be ignored in determining how social movements work); Alain
Touraine, Commentary on Dieter Rucht's Critique, in RESEARCH ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
supra note 20, at 385 (explaining that both the European and American approaches to
social movement research are valid, but that each school of thought is actually studying
a different question and neither can fully answer how and why social movements oc-
cur).
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example is frame analysis, derived from the work of Erving Goffman"
A frame is a problem-solving scheme that individuals employ to make
sense of their environment. For social movement scholars, frame
analysis serves to explain how individuals develop shared perceptions
that serve as a basis for action, thus melding individual motivation
32
with organizational structures.
Legal scholarship, as it developed during the 1970s and 1980s,
featured, in parallel form, these same two themes. They constituted
the critique of the legal process movement that dominated the field
for the quarter century after World War II. The first theme was law
and economics, or, more precisely, rational actor theory. In the eco-
nomic sphere, reliance on this theory allowed microeconomic analysis
to be applied to legal problems;33 in the political sphere, this reliance
31 See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 10-11 (1974) (explaining that the defini-
tion of a social event is based on principles of organization that govern the event and
on individuals' shared perceptions of the event). In general, Goffman's work repre-
sents an important bridge between American and Continental sociology, in that he
brings Continental and particularly phenomenological perspectives to bear on the
sorts of detailed empirical studies of behavior that have been common in American
sociology. In addition to FRAME ANALYSIS, see ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL
(1967), which discusses face-to-face interactions in social settings; and ERVING
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959), which details how so-
cial life can be studied in domestic, industrial, or commercial social establishments.
32 See, e.g., COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 30, at
210 (explaining that there is a connection between forms of social organization and
individuals' perspectives of social experiences); WILLIAM A. GAMSON ET AL.,
ENCOUNTER WITH UNJUST AUTHORITY (1982) (discussing strategies for organizing to
deal with unjust authorities); William A. Gamson, Political Discourse and Collective Action,
1 INT'L SOC. MOVEMENT RES. 222 (1988) (stating that frames function to organize and
guide collective and individual action); Hank Johnston, A Methodology for Frame Analy-
sis, from Discourse to Cognitive Schema, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE, supra note
27, at 217 (defining frames as mental orientations that organize perception and inter-
pretation); David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Move-
ment Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464 (1986) (stating that frame alignment explains
how individuals' values and interests become congruent to social movement organiza-
tions' activities, goals, and ideologies); David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master
Frames and Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 133 (exploring the relation
between master frames and cycles of protest by enumerating ten interconnected
propositions).
3 See generally ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000) (analyzing
constitutions by using models of strategic behavior created for markets and adapted to
politics); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1997) (ex-
plaining how economics can be used to explain legal rules and institutions); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991) (explaining the rationales for rules of corporate law through economic princi-
ples); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987) (asserting that theories of economic efficiency explain rules of tort law);
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, COSTLY POLICIES: STATE REGULATION
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facilitated adaptation of microeconomics into what was soon called
public choice theory. 4 Olson's Logic of Collective Action was one of the
theoretical works that launched public choice theory, along with
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of Consen 5
and William H. Riker's The Theory of Political Coalitions. According to
public choice theory, political actors behave in an instrumentally ra-
tional manner to maximize their material self-interests. Voters try to
maximize their wealth, while elected politicians try to maximize their
chance of re-election.
A second theme in legal scholarship was critical studies, that is the
outsider scholarship initiated by the critical legal studies movement.
Critical legal studies is derived from critical theory; it asserts that law is
an instrument of social control by dominant economic interests that
act through the political process.3 Law functions, in part, as an in-
AND ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS (1993) (analyzing and offering
solutions for problems of state and federal regulation of the insurance industry); A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989) (ex-
plaining how economists analyze legal rules); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998) (applying an economist's view to various areas of the
law, including tort damages, contracts, family law, and corporate finance).
34 For general accounts of public choice, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); and DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989). For applications of the approach, see, for exam-
ple, WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1984); Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 703 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Geoffrey
P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Mar-
garine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading
of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cull. L. REV. 263 (1982).
35 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
36 WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).
37 See, e.g., MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860, at xvi (1977) (arguing that during the antebellum period legal regulations be-
came a major instrument of powerful entrepreneurial and commercial groups);
ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) (using critical theory to ana-
lyze law as a means of socio-economic domination); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 2 (1986) (asserting that accepted legal ideas do
not allow for a just, defensible society); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1980) (asserting that current law is structured in a way that
will continue to keep cities at a disadvantage because cities are often severely limited
on the amount of tax they can impose on their residents); Duncan Kennedy, The Struc-
ture of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979) (describing how the struc-
ture of the legal system, as reflected in Blackstone, leads to social domination); Karl
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Conscious-
ness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 272 (1978) (arguing that big business was able
to stop social reform during the early twentieth century); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
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strument of pure coercion, but also, and much more importantly, as a
crucial element in the ideology of liberal democracy. The older
claims of legal scholars were that law was a neutral set of principles
that existed apart from the political process and that law sets limits on
that process. This absolute view, now known as legal formalism , was
somewhat undermined by the critique of legal realism, and eventually
replaced by the legal process argument that law was a relatively neu-
tral instrument deployed by political decision makers in certain cir-
39cumstances . In fact, critical legal studies scholars argued, law is a
means of social control by the elite, and thus a means of social oppres-
sion; its assertion of neutrality, whether absolute or relative, is an ideo-
logical claim that makes the oppression more complete and even
harder to combat. Critical legal studies scholars attempted to combat
it by demonstrating that law's claimed neutrality was false and its sup-
posed logic incoherent, thus revealing its role as an instrumentality of
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1194 (1985) (discussing how laissez-faire ideology
dominated judicial decision making and politics during the Lochner era); Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 22-23
(1984) (stating that it could easily be argued that the Constitution prohibits capitalism
as it is presently practiced in the United States); Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 784 (1983)
(asserting that, as a result of the first substantive due process era, it became clear that
judges are political actors, motivated primarily by their own interests and values).
38 For discussions of formalism, see Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U.
Prr. L. REV. 1 (1983); Dennis Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 196
(1995); and G. Edward White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law 1880-1910, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1978).
39 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 77 (1962) (stat-
ing that the political views of Supreme Court Justices can have a strong effect on how
they interpret the law); CHARLES BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 170-71
(1960) (arguing that judges should have the power of judicial review as well as the
power to decide questions of policy); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 92-93
(1964) (stating that laws should be clearly expressed in general rules and made known
to the public but that achieving and applying these rules is difficult for political deci-
sion makers); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 646 (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (arguing that it is impossible to ex-
clude from the concept of adjudication the function of exercising an ad hoc discretion
by judges when framing a remedy for the claimant); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) (arguing that adjudication of legal
disputes loses its meaning if the arbiter of the dispute is prejudiced); Herbert Wech-
sler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1959) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court sometimes incorrectly bases decisions on value judgments
rather than on reasoning, analysis, and proofs). For discussions of legal process, see
William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The
Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra; Kent Greenwalt, The Enduring Significance of
Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978); and Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal
Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1393 (1996).
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the dominant elite. Critical race scholars, feminists, and gaylegal
40 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIALJUSTICE 63 (1987) (arguing that civil rights litigation promotes the interests of
the white majority); IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE 1 (1996) (stating that racial identity was a prerequisite to citizenship in Amer-
ica from 1790 to 1952); PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 50
(1991) (stating that the constitutional omission of African Americans was a part of the
original intent of the Founding Fathers); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L.
REV. 539, 543 (stating that white males are in the position to oppress black feminist
writers, and black feminist writers must write with an empowering voice to prevent this
oppression); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transforma-
lion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1336-37 (1988)
(arguing that the Reagan administration's colorblind view of civil rights was hostile to-
ward the civil rights movement); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (contending that the phrase "We the People"
in the United States Constitution silences the voices of black women); Alex M. John-
son, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle
to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1611 (1995) (asserting that govern-
ment lender policies discriminate against African Americans in the residential housing
market); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (arguing that the government
often makes unconscious racially discriminatory decisions, and that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires the elimination of all government decisions that take race into
account without good reasons); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RFJv. 323, 327 (1987) (stating that law
serves to legitimate existing unfair distributions of wealth and power). Critical race
theory explicitly saw itself not only as an extension of critical legal studies' essentially
critical stance, but also as a shift in both the causal explanation for oppression and the
subject matter of concern. See, e.g., Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The
Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 986 (1990)
(stating that the critical legal studies movement does not appreciate the role the state
can play in eliminating racism); Harlan L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV 435, 436 (1987) (arguing that most critical legal studies theorists only seek
to "trash" the "liberal legal consciousness" and that it is now also necessary to formu-
late a positive program to combat our dominant belief systems); Richard Delgado, The
Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 301, 315 (1987) (maintaining that critical legal studies theorists are wrong
in assuming that racism is just another form of class-based oppression and that their
focus on informed processes is unhelpful because a society that enacts formal rules
and structures to prevent racism announces that racism is intolerable).
41 See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
116 (1989) (asserting that male dominance may be the most pervasive system of power
in history); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAw 42 (1990) (stating that although political struggles have persuaded
legislatures and courts to reverse some legal restrictions against women, laws continue
to exclude women from activities engaged in by men and to restrict women's decisions
about their own lives); ROBIN WEST, CARING FORJUSTICE 132 (1997) (stating that in
many societies patriarchy is encoded in legal norms, and breaking those norms elicits
legal sanctions); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 313 (1995) (asserting that the government is deeply
implicated in the oppression of women); Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3
YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 189, 274-75 (1991) (proposing a system of feminist due process
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scholars then followed suit by asserting that the law was an instru-
mentality of a white or male or heterosexual elite, and that its ideo-
logical hold must be undermined by the development of new identi-
ties on the part of the excluded groups, rather than the revelation of
its internal contradictions.
jurisprudence that would facilitate fair and compassionate treatment of women and
the poor by the government); Lucinda M. Findley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way
Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1120-21 (1986)
(arguing that the American legal system subordinates women by not making the work-
place more accommodating to pregnancy); Herma Hill Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REV. 39, 70 (asserting that decisions in Supreme Court sex discrimination cases
reflect traditional male and female social roles); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 955 (1984) (formulating a stronger constitutional
framework of sex-based equality); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1991) (asserting that the law
does not adequately recognize that over fifty percent of women are victims of domestic
violence); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 40 (1987) (contending that the Supreme Court's treatment of
pregnancy and workplace issues demonstrates the influence of the unstated male
norm in analyses of gender discrimination cases); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gen-
der, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 801 (1989) (arguing that the American labor system cur-
rently limits workers to two unacceptable choices: the traditional male life pattern or
women's traditional economic vulnerability). Here, too, there was an explicitly voiced
intention to reformulate the methodology of the critical theory studies critique to ad-
dress different issues. See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv.
L. REV. 829, 829-30 (1990) (offering a new feminist method to solve legal problems
called "positionality," which states that truth is not final and feminists have an obliga-
tion to continue to extend truth); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of a Feminist Jurispru-
dence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1373-74 (1986) (arguing that legal rules and doc-
trine, the traditional way for feminists to solve social problems, are inadequate for
solving problems of inequality); Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theories of the State
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 985, 986 (1990) (stating that psychological
and pluralist theories of law and the state are helpful in thinking about some feminist
problems); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 71-72 (1988)
(suggesting that for feminists to fight effectively the profound power imbalance be-
tween men and women, feminists must envision a postpatriarchal world and use that
vision to formulate new goals and strategies).
42 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET 217 (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW] (arguing that states prefer
traditional marriage in their laws and that some believe that gay lifestyles are not mor-
ally equal to heterosexual lifestyles); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 88-90 (1996) (ex-
amining the assumptions underlying mainstream objections to same-sex marriage);
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459,
468-69 (1990) (stating that the law requires that a child has one parent of each sex and
asserting that this policy does not necessarily serve children's best interests); Kendall
Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (1992) (arguing
that laws against homosexual sodomy have been consistently supported by homopho-
bic public officials). For discussions of methodology, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gay-
legal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994).
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Reliance on the same underlying theory, and even the same spe-
cific sources for that theory, does not guarantee the mutual compre-
hensibility of two separate academic fields, of course. Atomic physics
and medical research, while they share the same natural science epis-
temology, and recognize the same progenitors of this approach, are
distinctly different fields. But when two fields are based on similar
methodological foundations, and focus on the same subject matter,
one would expect them to maintain a fairly direct discourse with each
other. For example, it has been shown that atomic physicists and re-
search physicians worked together in developing nuclear magnetic
resonance devices, and that the two fields were readily able to under-
stand the relevance of each other's work.43 Social movement theorists
and legal scholars, however, have been looking at the same things and
sharing essentially the same methodology for doing so, for the last
three decades, without finding very much in each other's work of per-
ceived use. Even Joel Handler's lucid explication of the overlap be-




A. Rational Actor Theory
The most obvious explanation for the mutual isolation of social
movements literature and legal scholarship is methodological. Al-
though they draw their origins from the same sources, the two fields
seem to have interpreted these sources differently, and drawn differ-
ent lessons from them. With respect to rational actor theory, legal
scholars bought into the pure version of Olson's theory, while social
scientists never took it quite as seriously. Olson, like other adapters of
microeconomics, believes that people's primary motivation is to
maximize their material self-interest. 45 This motivation, when com-
43 See generally JAMES MATI'SON & MERRILL SIMON, THE PIONEERS OF NMR AND
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IN MEDICINE: THE STORY OF MRI (1996) (profiling the key in-
dividuals responsible for the development of magnetic resonance scanning and imag-
ing).
44 See HANDLER, supra note 18 (setting forth a theoretical framework for evaluating
the experience of social reform groups and law reform lawyers). Not only does Han-
dler's book contain fairly complete citations to the resource mobilization literature
that was available at the time, but the Foreword to the book was written by Mayer Zald.
Mayer N. Zald, Foreword to id., at ix. This indicates a level of mutual awareness that
might have been expected to lead to further investigation and collaboration.
45 See OLSON, supra note 21, at 60-65 (discussing profit-maximizing behavior in.
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bined with a theory of groups and organizations, will prevent ordinary
people from organizing to lobby for desirable public policies. Olson
begins by contesting "the traditional view... that private organiza-
tions and groups are ubiquitous, and that this ubiquity is due to a
fundamental human propensity to form and join associations.,
46 In
fact, since people are rational self-interest maximizers, they will not
engage in collective action unless the benefits of such action exceed
its costs. The result is that many economic interests will have too
small an impact on the individual to produce the high levels of indi-
vidual commitment needed to sustain organized efforts.
7 Many citi-
zens would desire economic benefits from a law deregulating the in-
surance industry, for example, but the benefit would represent only a
small proportion of their total wealth, and would thus receive a pro-
portionately small share of their attention. They would vote in favor
of this policy if it were presented to them in a referendum, and might
even treat it as a decisive issue in voting for political candidates, but
they would be willing to spend only limited amounts of time on more
intensive political activities such as lobbying, and would contribute to
such efforts only limited amounts of money. 4" Even these limited
commitments will not materialize, however, because of the free-rider
large groups). Olson concedes that "[e]conomic incentives are not, to be sure, the
only incentives; people are sometimes also motivated by a desire to win prestige, re-
spect, friendship, and other social and psychological objectives." Id. at 60. But he then
tries to argue this concession away, first by asserting that these "social incentives" are
individual, non-collective goods, then by asserting that they only operate in small
groups, and finally by claiming that they tend to track economic efficiency. Id. at 64-
65. With respect to the last point, he says: "Anyone who has observed a farming com-
munity... knows that the most productive farmer... is usually the one with the high-
est status." Id. at 62. Based on this explanation, he then goes on to ignore non-
economic incentives. See id. at 62 ("[T]here is no presumption that social incentives
will lead individuals ... to obtain a collective good."). Most social scientists, however,
would recognize social incentives that are not individual in Olson's sense, such as altru-
ism, cooperativeness, and ideology, and would argue that even individualized social
incentives, such as the desire for prestige or friendship, do not track economic ration-
ality very well at all.
46 Id. at 17. To support his claim that this is the traditional view, Olson cites sev-
eral sociologists, including Georg Simmel. See id. at 17 n.28 (citing GEORG SIMMEL,
CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUI' AFFILIATIONS (Kurt H. Wolff & Reinhard Bendix
trans., 1955). As stated above, Simmel was a principal source of inspiration for the
Chicago School of Sociology. See supra note 9 (highlighting Simmel's influential role
in the Continental social movement literature).
47 Id. at 126 ("[]f the individuals in any large group are interested in their own
welfare, they will not voluntarily make any sacrifices to help their group attain its politi-
cal (public or collective) objectives.").
8 See id. at 163-64 (noting the free-rider problem among political parties seeking
collective benefits).
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problem. Legislation deregulating the insurance industry will benefit
the vast majority of citizens; the benefits of this presumably beneficial
policy cannot be limited to those who worked for its enactment. This
will encourage each citizen to free ride on the efforts of others, with
the unfortunate result that no one will devote even limited efforts to
this mutually beneficial goal.4 )
The only interests that will coalesce into sustained lobbying ef-
forts, in Olson's theory, are those that represent a large proportion of
the individual's wealth and are shared by manageably small numbers
of individuals. Insurance agents, for example, will favor regulatory
legislation that provides them with rents; because these rents comprise
a significant portion of their personal wealth, they will be prepared to
devote significant amounts of time and money to this effort. None-
theless, they would prefer to free ride on other's efforts, as do ordi-
nary citizens. But because of their relatively small numbers, the policy
entrepreneurs who organize them and derive their own livelihood
from this activity can police them and compel them to participate.
They can exclude non-participating insurance agents from the organi-
zations they create, thereby threatening their jobs, the network of re-
ferrals from their colleagues, or the information sources on which
they rely.50
From this tale of untrammeled avarice, public choice-oriented le-
gal scholars derived a theory of political market failure. Small groups
of people with concentrated interests, such as independent insurance
agents, would coalesce, exercising major effects on the political proc-
ess. Large groups with diffuse interests-the many citizens who would
desire significant, but proportionately smaller benefits from lower in-
surance rates-would not. The result is that the insurance agents will
be able to extract rents from the political system by means of regula-
tion that blunts the competitive market. This is a political market
failure-the inability of an elected government to serve the interests
of the majority that elected them. The normative conclusion legal
49 See id. at 43-52 (discussing the effects of free riding on the collective good).
50 See id. at 2243 (describing how free riding works in small groups). Olson is re-
alistic enough to recognize that there are organizations representing diffuse interests
of large groups of people. But writing in 1965, just before the rise of environmental-
ism and other social movements, he took the political lobbying efforts of labor unions
as the paradigmatic example of such groups. He was then able to maintain his theory
by noting that these efforts were the by-product of an organization that had both the
capacity to coerce and the ability to provide positive benefits. See id. at 132-37 (discuss-
ing the "by-product" theory of large pressure-group lobbying, particularly of labor un-
ions).
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scholars drew from this failure is that the public would be served only
by deregulation, a reduction of the inevitably distorted political sys-
tem, and a return to the undisturbed operation of the economic
sphere. Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing until today, they
have documented the special-interest origins of the administrative
state and marked its ill effects.
5
1
Social scientists drew rather different lessons from Olson's theory.
Most of them were entirely unpersuaded by the claim that people are
motivated exclusively by material self-interest. In their view, ideology
was a crucially important factor.5 2 Their methodology recommended
51 See, e.g., Richard Doernberg & Fred McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and De-
creasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987) (discussing the rate of tax
reform as a function of endogenous legislative changes); Richard Epstein, A Common
Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357
(1983) (attacking the New Deal as inconclusive on the debate regarding the function
of labor law); Jonathan Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function:
The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1 (1983) (examining the Glass-Steagall Act
and the controversy surrounding commercial bank underwriting of commercial pa-
per); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins and Fu-
ture of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769 (1991) (predicting the inevitable demise
of commercial banking); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws,
70 TEXAS L. REV. 347 (1992) (commenting on the influence of special-interest lobby-
ing during the creation of the blue sky laws); Geoffrey Miller, The 7True Story of Carolene
Products, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 397 (outlining the history leading up to United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)); Kenneth Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licens-
ing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1975) (discussing the
decision-making process in bank regulation). See generally ROBERT MCCORMICK &
ROBERT TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE INTERESTL-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT (1981) (investigating the role of gov-
ernment as "brokers of wealth changes"); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (arguing against the assumption that statutes often have "the
answer"); Richard Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitu-
tion, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982) (discussing the economic theory of legislative and
constitutional interpretation).
52 See, e.g., GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN
COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY (1993) (examining the interaction of
ideology and opportunity among different components of social movements); DOUG
MCADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER (1988) (interviewing 348 civil rights volunteers); ANDREW
MCFARLAND, COMMON CAUSE: LOBBYING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1984) (considering
the ideological motivation of lobbying participants); OBERSCHALL, supra note 22 (ana-
lyzing the role of preexisting preference structures in creating social movements);
JOHN WILSON, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1973) (discussing the role of
socialization and personal identity); McCarthy & Zald, supra note 4, at 1217-18, re-
printed in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 20 (Mayer N. Zald &
John D. McCarthy eds., 1987) (defining a social movement as "a set of opinions and
beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the
social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society"); Mayer Zald & Roberta
Ash, Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change, 44 SOC. FORCES 327
(1966) (arguing that ideological factors disrupt Weber-Michels's iron law of oligarchy).
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ideological explanations to them, and thus sensitized them to the em-
pirical evidence that made such explanations appear unavoidable.
They knew that the diffuse interests that, in Olson's view, could not
coalesce, did so, and did so dramatically, a few short years after his
book was published. 53 Nothing could be more diffuse than people's
interest in cleaning up the water everybody drinks and the air every-
body breathes, unless it is their interest in a wilderness that nobody
ever visits, or the animal that nobody sees in the wild. Nothing could
have less of an effect on people's material self-interest than the ago-
nies to which mice and monkeys were subjected in the recondite
chambers of academic laboratories. Yet people with these interests
engaged in demonstrations, contributed time and money to organiza-
tions, and coordinated their votes, creating political forces as effective
as the Independent Insurance Agents or the National Association of
Lawn Decoration Manufacturers. 4
The opportunity to free ride on the efforts of committed partici-
pants not only failed to prevent these participants from continuing
their efforts, but proved to be a major argument for their continua-
tion. The organizing literature of virtually every modern social
Alternatively, they argued that movements survived by generating ideological commit-
ments. See, e.g., Eric Hirsch, The Creation of Political Solidarity in Social Movement Organi-
zations, 27 Soc. Q. 373 (1986) (examining incentive-based motivation at different lev-
els of involvement in social movement organizations). This could be given a cynical
spin that would be pleasant to microeconomists (movements are simply the result of
efforts by self-interested policy entrepreneurs), but it still relies on the idea that people
are motivated by ideology. In critiquing the value of the microeconomic model for
social movement theory, Myra Marx Ferree states: "The superficial attractiveness of its
empirically testable incentive formulations conceals theoretically dangerous assump-
tions, carried over uncritically from Olson, that threaten the ability of [resource mobi-
lization theory] to explain what social movements are and do." Myra Marx Ferree, The
Political Context of Rationality: Rational Choice Theory and Resource Mobilization, in
FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 29, 30. Her claim is that Olson's model may be a "Trojan
Horse" that smuggles a material, self-interested image of human beings into a social
movements literature that relies heavily on ideological motivations. Id. at 29.
53 See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND
PUBLIC ACTION 74-79 (1982) (discussing the influence of "selective incentives" to
maintain social group membership); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1973) (theorizing on the behavior of formal organizations); Mark Granovetter,
Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. Soc. (1978) (outlining the utility of
threshold models in sociological theory); Bert Klandermans, Mobilization and Participa-
tion: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 583
(1984) (making the case for social psychology in social movements).
54 See supra notes 14-16 (citing sources). For discussions of the reason why social
movements are able to overcome the free-rider problem, see RICK FANTASIA,
CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACTION, AND CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
WORKERS (1988); Fireman & Gamson, supra note 20; Marx Ferree, supra note 52.
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movement is filled with calls to action on behalf of those who cannot,
or will not, protect themselves. Wilderness areas, animals, uneducated
consumers, oppressed women, fetuses, terrorized minorities, helpless
prisoners of conscience, oblivious victims of a potential nuclear disas-
ter, unborn generations, and insensate Mother Earth all figure as ex-
plicit beneficiaries of these organizing efforts. One can think of such
ideologically motivated participation as providing psychological re-
wards, if one finds that discourse reassuring, but that is essentially in-
distinguishable from ideology itself. The social scientists who studied
these movements never doubted that the movements were ideologi-
cally motivated, and never accepted Olson's model of material self-
interest maximizing the way legal scholars did.
These social scientists, however, found Olson's work, and related
rational actor theories, of great value for a different reason. Previous
theories, relying on explanations such as social frustration, disloca-
tion, anomie, or rising expectations, could not account for either the
timing or the character of social movements.
5 Underlying these lacu-
nae in the standard explanations of social movements was a more ba-
sic methodological dissatisfaction. These explanations dealt in rather
gaseous generalities that did not even aspire to identify particularly
convincing causal mechanisms. 56 As the successes of microeconomics
began persuading social scientists that the best theories were those
that linked large-scale events to individual behavior-those that
adopted the epistemological stance of methodological individual-
ism-the standard explanations for social movements seemed to ex-
plain less and less. Olson's theory offered an alternative approach.
His starting point was the exact same dissatisfaction, that is, a dissatis-
faction with those explanations of group behavior that were based on
instinctive, irrational propensities. His account of instrumental ra-
tionality, organizational dynamics, and free riders supplied the out-
lines of a more rigorous explanation for social movements, an expla-
nation that social scientists could use if it were freed from its
empirically unjustified insistence on material self-interest.
55 See David Snyder & Charles Tilly, Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830 to
1960, 37 AM. Soc. REV. 520 (1972) (explaining how violence by social movements cor-
related with electoral opportunities rather than unfavorable economic conditions).
56 See Doug McAdam, Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism, I INT'L
SOC. MOVEMENT REs. 125, 127 (1988) ("Movements may occur in a broad macro con-
text, but their actual development clearly depends on a series of more specific dynam-
ics o perating at the micro level.").
See OLSON, supra note 21, at 16-22 (asserting that human instinct to join associa-
tions does not explain social movements).
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In developing a theory of social movements based on Olson's
work, therefore, social scientists began with the well-founded assump-
tion that people are regularly motivated by purely ideological con-8
cerns. But once one adopts the epistemological stance of methodo-
logical individualism, even to a limited extent, it becomes apparent
that such concerns do not translate directly into a social movement;
people will not automatically take to the streets as soon as they de-
velop some ideological commitment. What they will do, as Olson
suggests, is take instrumentally rational action to implement their ide-
ology. If there is no organizational context that provides the oppor-
tunity to act in a politically effective way, they will simply maintain
their commitments as a personal view and satisfy themselves by getting
into political arguments with their relatives. But if such an organiza-
tional context is created, people with commitments will contribute
money and effort. The creation of these organizations is often the
work of committed leaders; ° it is these leaders, therefore, who mobi-
lize the resources needed to create an active social movement."
M See supra note 52 and accompanying text (giving examples of ideological moti-
vations throughout history).
59 This is particularly the case when participation involves significant risk. See
Doug McAdam, Recruitment to High Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer, 92 AM. J.
Soc. 64 (1986) (arguing that both structural and individual motivational factors are
crucial for one to participate in high-risk activism); Zald, supra note 21, at 332 (noting
that individuals make rational decisions concerning their participation in social
movements).
6 James Q. Wilson uses the term "policy entrepreneurs" for these leaders. See
WILSON, supra note 53, at 196-98 (defining an entrepreneur of voluntary associations
as a leader and recruiter of these organizations); James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regula-
tion, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 370 (1980) (discussing "policy entrepre-
neurs" in politics and business regulations). Wilson is generally not regarded as a so-
cial movement scholar, although he is clearly concerned with many of the same issues
and shares some of the same insights. The difference lies in Wilson's tendency to de-
value or ignore the motivations of the movement participants entirely, and to treat
their involvement as the product of persuasion or manipulation by the leaders. His
use of the term entrepreneurs for these leaders is indicative of this perspective.
61 See, e.g., MCCARTHY & ZALD, supra note 22, at 22 (stating that Ralph Nader's or-
ganizations have expanded due to the finances he has obtained through speaking fees,
published reports, and private donations); Bert Klandermans, The Formation and Mobili-
zation of Consensus, 1 INT'L SOC. MOVEMENT RES. 173, 184 (1988) (listing different ways
a social movement leader can mobilize part of the population); Clarence Lo, Mobilizing
the Tax Revolt: The Emergent Alliance Between Homeowners and Local Elites, 6 RES. SOC.
MOVEMENTS CONFLICTS & CHANGE 293, 294-310 (1984) (explaining how community
elites have initiated protest actions against taxes); Doug McAdam, Tactical Innovation
and the Pace of Insurgency, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 735 (1983) (describing the tactical innova-
tions of black civil rights leaders between 1955 and 1970); John McCarthy & Mark
Wolfson, Consensus Movements, Conflict Movements, and the Cooptation of Civic and State
Infrastructures, in FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 273, 279 (stating that civic leaders must
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Some of the resources that contribute to the creation of a social
movement are the obvious ones provided by the movement's partici-
pants, namely effort and money. There is an incremental, or co-
causal aspect to the utilization of these resources. A policy entrepre-
neur needs some sort of organizational structure to solicit funds or
obtain voluntary efforts, and an even larger structure to convince her
membership that she is using these resources to accomplish things she
regards as desirable.63 But the more money and funds and effort she
obtains, the greater her ability to solicit 
further money and effort.
64
Her success will depend upon the complex interplay of risks and re-
wards for potential participants at each successive stage, a process de-
scribed as micromobilization." ' This process often leads to competi-
tion among policy entrepreneurs, the emergence of a few successful
mobilize resources and participate in order to bring social change); Sidney Tarrow,
States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements, in COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 30, at 41, 59 (stating that civil rights
leaders mobilized college students and helped them create sit-ins).
62 See, e.g.,John D. McCarthy, Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Mobilization: Infrastructure Defi-
cits and New Technologies, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, supra
note 4, at 49, 50-59 (holding that the pro-life movement is stronger than the pro-
choice movement because of the difference in efforts of the groups' members); John
D. McCarthy et al., The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements by the State in the
United States, 13 RES. SOC. MOVEMENTS CONFLICTS & CHANGE 45 (1991) (describing
fundraising mechanisms of certain social movement organizations); Pamela E. Oliver
& Gerald Marwell, Mobilizing Technologies for Collective Action, in FRONTIERS, supra note
21, at 251, 252 (stating that motivated activists are "willing to spend their own time and
money on an issue"); Naomi Rosenthal & Michael Schwartz, Spontaneity and Democracy
in Social Movements, 2 INT'L SOC. MOVEMENT RES. 33 (1989); Jack L. Walker, Jr., The
Mobilization of Political Interests in America, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA:
PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 33 (Joel D. Aberbach et al. eds.,
1991) (stating the importance of wealthy individuals, corporations, foundations, and
the federal government to interest groups because of the financial support they pro-
vide).
63 See GAMSON, supra note 22, at 89-109 (describing the internal structure of social
protest groups, including how bureaucratic organization prevents factionalism); Hank
Johnston, The Marketed Social Movement: A Case Study of the Rapid Growth of TM, 23 PAC.
SOC. REV. 333 (1980) (explaining how an internal grievance mechanism aided the
transcendental meditation movement in accomplishing its goals).
64 In addition, such organizational success may also elicit financial contributions
from sympathetic outside sources. SeeJ. Craig Jenkins & Craig M. Eckert, Channeling
Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and Professional Social Movement Organizations in the De-
velopment of the Black Movement, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 812 (1986) (describing how founda-
tion grants to civil rights organizations followed effective social protest by these organi-
zations, rather than catalyzing such protest).
T5 WILLIAM A. GAMSON ET" AL., ENCOUNTERS WITH UNJUST AUTHORITY 1-12 (Robin
M. Williams, Jr. & Charles M. Bonjean eds., 1982) (explaining micromobilization);
OBERSCHALL, supra note 22, at 161-72 (analyzing the risks and rewards of participating
in a social movement).
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ones, and then the increasing institutionalization of their organiza-
tions. A common pattern would be for the entrepreneur to obtain a
small amount of funds, then to use those funds to organize voluntary
• 67efforts such as a protest march or demonstration, and then to parlay
the visibility obtained thereby to obtain additional finding.
Apart from the resources of the participants, other resources are
available. First, there are resources from the political system."' At the
most obvious level, the existing rules of the legal system are likely to
favor certain movements, or certain types of action, and disfavor oth-
69
ers. Beyond this, the interactive nature of government in the United
States and Western Europe provides innumerable opportunities for
organized groups to influence elections, lobby elected officials be-
tween elections, and lobby appointed officials. Any impact upon elec-
tions or public decision making becomes a "deliverable" that policy
entrepreneurs can use to increase the number or commitment level of
their memberships. Second, incidents can be used as resources-an
environmental disaster, such as Three Mile Island; 7' a political event,
66 See McCARTHY & ZALD, supra note 22, at 17-25 (describing the classical model
for the rise and fall of social movements).
67 On the use of protest marches and demonstrations as a strategic device, see
JAMES DENARDO, POWER IN NUMBERS: THE POLITICAL STRATEGY OF PROTEST AND
REBELLION (1985); BARBARA EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PROTEST AND CULTURAL
REVOLUTION: NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION IN THE 1970S AND 1980S (1991); JOHN
LOFLAND, PROTEST: STUDIES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(1985); ROCHON, supra note 10, at 3-24; and TARROW, supra note 21, at 100-69.(is See generally MCADAM, supra note 16, at 36-59 (defining a social movement as a
political process); TARROW, supra note 21, at 71-91 (demonstrating how political re-
sources often provide important opportunities in politics for social movements); TILLY,
supra note 17, at 58 (listing "voting, party work, holding office, and communicating
with legislators" as resources in the American political system that are important to so-
cial movements); Charles Tilly, Social Movements and National Politics, in STATEMAKING
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: ESSAYS IN HISTORYAND THEORY 297 (Charles Bright & Susan
Harding eds., 1984) (concluding that the success of a social movement partially de-
pends on national politics).
69 SeeJohn D. McCarthy et al., supra note 62 (describing the effect of postal and
internal revenue regulations on social movements).
70 See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK
INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 148 (1982) (theorizing that external support of the civil
rights movement was a product of black protest activity); SIDNEY TARROw, DEMOCRACY
AND DISORDER: PROTEST AND POLITICS IN ITALY, 1965-1975, at 217-90 (1989) (examin-
ing the role of social movement organizers in Italian protests during the late 1 960s and
early 1970s);J. CraigJenkins & Charles Perrow, Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker
Movements (1946-1972), 42 AM. Soc. REV. 249 (1977) (modeling the effect the political
environment had on the success and failure of farm worker movements); Snyder & Til-
ley, supra note 55 (addressing the effects of hardship on collective violence in France)71 See RAYMOND L. GOLDSTEEN &JOHN K. SCHORR, DEMANDING DEMOCRACY AFTER
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like a reduction in welfare benefits;
72 a dramatic legal case, such as one
where a woman murders her abusive husband; an unplanned action
by potential members, such as the Stonewall riot.
7
3 The Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
4 virtually created the anti-abortion
movement.75  A third, closely related resource is media coverage,
which not only amplifies the effect of any incident, but also functions
as an independent force. When the media cover a particular social
movement organization in a news or feature story, they provide that
organization with free publicity for recruiting new members and im-
pressing its existing ones.7" Many protest activities by these organiza-
THREE MILE ISLAND 157-65 (1991) (explaining that after the Three Mile Island nuclear
accident, many residents mobilized by joining and establishing groups that organized
meetings, rallies, and marches); WALSH, supra note 16 (providing a comprehensive
study of post-accident mobilization); see also Paul Slovic et al., Characterizing Perceived
Risk, in PERILOUS PROGRESS: MANAGING THE HAZARDS OF TECHNOLOGY 91 (Robert W.
Kates et al. eds., 1985) (discussing study participants' perceptions of the risk of nuclear
power).
72 See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from a Law
School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (2001) (describing the collaboration of a grass-
roots welfare rights organization and a law school clinic in the wake of the reduction of
welfare benefits in the mid-1990s).
73 See MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993) (telling the stories of Stonewall riot
participants and how the riot affected gay resistance); ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note
42, at 99 ("Literally overnight, the Stonewall riots transformed the homophile reform
movement of several dozen homosexuals into a gay liberation movement populated by
thousands of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals who formed hundreds of organizations
demanding radical changes in the way gay people were treated by the state.").
74 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75 See LUKER, supra note 13, at 37 (noting that pro-life group members "reported
that they became mobilized to the cause on the very day the decision was handed
down"); RAYMOND TATALOVICH & BYRON W. DAYNES, THE POLITICS OF ABORTION 149
(1981) (characterizing the pro-life movement "as a reaction" against the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade).
76 See SZASZ, supra note 7, at 67 ("The period of most intense media coverage was
followed by a surge of social movement activity."); William A. Gamson & Andre Modi-
gliani, Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach, 95
AM. J. Soc. 1, 6-7 (1989) (explaining that organizations sometimes sponsor media ac-
tivities); William A. Gamson & Gadi Wolfsfeld, Movements and Media as Interacting Sys-
tems, 528 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 114 (1993) (illustrating social move-
ments' dependence on the media to report their messages to the public); Harvey
Molotch, Media and Movements, in THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note
20, at 71 ("For [social movements], the mass media represent a potential mechanism
for utilizing an establishment institution to fulfill nonestablishment goals: communi-
cating with movement followers, reaching out to potential recruits, neutralizing would-
be opponents, and confusing or otherwise immobilizing committed opponents.");
Harvey Molotch & Marilyn Lester, Accidental News: The Great Oil Spill as Local Occurrence
and National Event, 81 AM. J. Soc. 235, 238-58 (1975) (describing how conservation
groups and oil companies sought advantageous coverage of the Santa Barbara oil
spill); cf GAMSON, supra note 22, at 161 ("In addition to its use as a partial defense
2001]
32 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW
tions are primarily designed to attract such coverage, rather than to
produce any direct effect on political leaders. Fourth, alliances with
other organizations, made in the political sphere, the social sphere, or
even the economic sphere, can serve as a resource for a social move-
ment organization. And fifth, but by no means finally, the competi-
tion among social movement organizations for the same members, the
same political contacts, the same association with dramatic incidents,
the same media coverage, and the same alliances means that having a
leading position with respect to an issue can also function as a re-
77source.
Nor is the resource-mobilization perspective limited to the actions
of policy entrepreneurs. Other social scientists who have adopted this
approach treat social movements as the product of more localized or
indigenous organizing efforts, and emphasize the organizational ca-
pacities of the members themselves-their ability to mount protests,
organize electoral campaigns, lobby politicians, react to dramatic in-
cidents, and garner media coverage without an institutionally estab-
lished leadership.7" Here, the issue of opportunity looms even larger
against some repressive forms of social control, the media spotlight can be used proac-
tively."); TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING 251 (1980) (noting that
journalists are susceptible to pressure from organizations).
77 See Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy, Social Movement Industries: Competition
and Conflict Among SMOs, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, supra
note 4, at 161 (analyzing competition among social movements). In a similar manner,
the existence of an influential social movement often serves as a resource for the crea-
tion of a countervailing social movement that mobilizes those in opposition. See
LUKER, supra note 13, at 144 (noting that Roe v. Wade mobilized a stronger opposition
to abortion reform); Clarence Y.H. Lo, Countermovements and Conservative Movements in
the Contemporary U.S., 8 ANN. REV. Soc. 107, 112-18 (1982) (discussing the counter-
movements of the pro-life, Stop ERA, and anti-busing movements); Tahi L. Mottl, The
Analysis of Countermovements, 27 SOC. PROBLEMS 620 (1980) (analyzing the anti-busing
counterreform movement in Boston); Bert Useem, Center-Periphey Conflict: Elite and
Popular Involvement in the Boston Anti-Busing Movement, 6 RES. SOC. MOVEMENTS
CONFLICTS & CHANGE 271 (1984) (using the center-periphery model to explain elite
and popular participation in the movement); Bert Useem & Mayer N. Zald, From Pres-
sure Group to Social Movement: Efforts to Promote Nuclear Power, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN
AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 273 (describing how industry support
for nuclear power mobilized antinuclear power social movements).
See, e.g.,JENKINS, supra note 16 (discussing how the resource-mobilization theory
emphasizes the indigenous resources, organization, and strategic position of excluded
groups); MCADAM, supra note 16, at 31 ("What the black movement shares in common
with many other insurgent challenges is the existence of an indigenous organizational
network in which it developed."); MORRIS, supra note 16 (examining how many local
organizations and movements helped to develop the civil rights movement); PIVEN &
CLOWARD, supra note 16 (describing flaws inherent in the mass-based permanent or-
ganization model); Aldon Morris, Black Southern Student Sit-In Movement: An Analysis of
Internal Organization, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 744 (1981) (theorizing on the effects of local
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and explains how movements can be mobilized without relying on the
proactive efforts of policy entrepreneurs. This localized perspective
tends to give social movements a more indigenous and idealistic cast,
and is thus favored by more left-oriented scholars such as Morris, or
Piven and Cloward, ' ' while the policy entrepreneur perspective has a
more cynical tone and attracts less overtly political scholars, such as
Oberschall or McCarthy and Zald. s°
Clearly, legal scholars and social scientists have used rational actor
theory differently, and have drawn different conclusions from Olson's
seminal work. These differences are significant, but they cannot be
regarded as the source of the disconnection between legal and social
science literature regarding social movements. The methodological
difference is simply not that large. While most social scientists reject
the idea that people are motivated solely by material self-interest, they
are certainly familiar with this approach from the public choice litera-
movement centers on the sit-in movement); Osha Neumann, Motherfuckers Then and
Now: My Sixties Problem, in CULTURAL POLITICS, supra note 20, at 55 (recounting the
author's personal experiences as a member of the small Sixties activist group the
Motherfuckers); Michael Schwartz & Shuva Paul, Resource Mobilization Versus the Mobili-
zation of People, in FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 205 (concluding that Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD) failed to be an instrument of social change because it did not
rely on large-scale mobilization for support); David A. Snow et al., Social Networks and
Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment, 45 AM. SOC. REV.
787 (1980) (emphasizing the importance of social networks in accounting for differ-
ences in social movement recruitment), reprinted in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: READINGS ON
THEIR EMERGENCE, MOBILIZATION, AND DYNAMICS 122 (Doug McAdam & David A.
Snow eds., 1997).
79 See MORRIS, supra note 16 (analyzing the origins of the civil rights movement
from an indigenous perspective); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 16 (analyzing the ori-
gins of the unemployed workers', industrial workers', civil rights, and welfare rights
movements from an indigenous perspective).
80 See TI-E DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 20 (examining the theory
and conceptual development of social movements); McCarthy & Zald, supra note 4 (dis-
cussing and examining changes in the resource mobilization approach to social move-
ments). The emphasis on outside funding, and the development of funded social
movement organizations, comes close, at certain points, to a denial that the movements
in question have any popular support apart from that which can be manufactured by
well-funded elites.
Piven and Cloward argue that the resource mobilization approach, particularly the
work of Charles Tilly and McCarthy and Zald, transforms social movements into mere
interest groups, and acts of social resistance into normal politics. The result is to un-
dermine the genuinely radical meaning of such movements, and the genuine griev-
ances that give rise to them. See Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Normalizing
Collective Protest, in FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 314 ("In recasting collective protest as
politics, however, [resource mobilization] analysts have normalized both the organiza-
tional forms typically associated with protests.., and the political processes generated
by protests.").
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ture in political science, and have no trouble adapting the insights it
provides, as indicated by their use of Olson's book itself. As far as le-
gal scholars are concerned, one would think that they would have
found great use for the detailed, empirically based application of ra-
tional actor theory to the mechanics of social movements, even if they
wanted to reject the underlying ideological motivations that were at-
tributed to the participants. Certainly, if one wants to assert the em-
pirically implausible position that people who participate in social
movements are really motivated by material self-interest, or if one
wants to assert the empirically implausible and logically contradictory
position that these people are systematically misled by materially self-
interested policy entrepreneurs, one should be particularly interested
in studies about the way these entrepreneurs make use of political,
economic, and social resources.
B. Critical Theory
There is a methodological divergence of similar proportions in
the use of critical theory by legal scholars and the Continental social
scientists who study social movements. Once again, the difference is
that legal scholars seem to take the sources of their intellectual inspi-
ration somewhat more literally than the social scientists do. Because
critical theory is a more diffuse, less comprehensive methodology than
rational actor theory, neither group of scholars pursued its insights
with the single-mindedness of the public choice or resource mobiliza-
tion scholars. Instead, they have used critical theory to provide them-
selves with an interpretation of society, a diagnosis of the times, and
then relied on other methodologies to advance their analysis and fur-
nish their prescriptions.
The scholars who initiated the critical legal studies movements'
81 See, e.g., MORTONJ. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-
1860 (1977) (laying the foundation for critical legal studies); ROBERTO UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) (presenting a comprehensive critical legal studies
doctrine); C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1981) (proposing a unity thesis in which means and ends
are united in the process of change); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979) (introducing a neo-Marxist method for
comprehending the political significance of legal thinking); Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 193 7-1941,
62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (analyzing the trajectory of American labor law with a
critical legal studies approach); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Cri-
tique ofInterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983) (denouncing
theories of constitutional law from a critical legal studies perspective).
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were strongly influenced by critical theory's 
emphasis on ideology.
s2
According to that theory, ideology and, in particular, claims that the
scientific, instrumentally pragmatic ideology of modem elites repre-
sented objective truth, were the mechanisms by which those elites
dominated society and controlled the disadvantaged majority. From
this insight, critical legal scholars derived the idea that one 
could
combat this domination by revealing that the asserted objectivity 
was
false. Law was a natural target of such an effort, since its claim to ob-
jectivity, or neutrality, was quite explicit, extending all the way back 
to
the legal formalists.
Even more enticing was the fact that this critique took direct aim
at the legal process school, which was the dominant approach to 
legal
scholarship when critical legal studies first developed.
s Legal process
was itself a response to legal realism, which had advanced an 
ener-
getic, but less philosophically sophisticated critique of law's 
neutral-
ity.s4 As discussed above, much of the legal process program involved
rehabilitating the claims of the preceding school of thought, 
now
known as formalism,
' in light of the political and institutional insights
of the legal realists. By doing so, legal process scholars were able 
to
reconnect with the formalist themes that still constituted the core 
of
legal teaching and scholarship in the United States. The whole 
idea
of analyzing the internal logic of a judicial decision, and the underly-
82 See supra note 24 (citing sources).
83 For leading examples of the legal process approach, see BICKEL, supra note 
39;
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); 
LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); HART & SACKS, supra note 39, 
writing from 1955 to
1958; and Lon Fuller, TheForms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. 
L. REV. 353 (1978),
writing from 1957 to 1961.
84 For examples of realism, see JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYITH AND
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE 
COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental 
Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurispru-
dence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); and Roscoe 
Pound, The Callfor a
Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). For discussions 
of legal realism, see
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William Fisher et al. eds., 1993); LAURA 
KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986);JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN 
LEGAL REALISM
AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); and G. Edward White, From 
Sociological Juris-
prudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Centuy 
America, 58
VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
85 For discussions of formalism, see Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY (1995); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1
(1983); Dennis Patterson, Langdel's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 196 
(1995); AnthonyJ.
Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054 (1995); 
and G. Edward
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ing claim that there was such a thing as legal reasoning, depended on
the formalist program and on the legal process school's ability to res-
urrect it. Critical theory's attack on objectivity and neutrality as in-
struments for social control, therefore, gave legal scholars who were soinclined a means of attacking the entire conceptual structure of
American legal scholarship. It gave them a means of attack, moreo-
ver, that engaged legal scholarship on exactly its own terms. One
need only demonstrate that law's claim to internal logic was false, that
judicial decisions did not follow from precedent, or that legal princi-
ples did not produce their purported implications, and the ideologi-
cal, oppressive character of law would be revealed.
The difficulty with this strategy, enticing as it seemed, is that thecritical theory that inspired it provided relatively little guidance for its
implementation. While critical theorists were quite insistent that pre-
vailing ideologies of liberal democracy were instruments of oppres-
sion, they generally tried to demonstrate this point by tracing thelinkages between the ideology and its general social implications, not
by parsing its putative internal logic. This approach came naturally to
them, since critical theory was directly drawn from Marx,8" and it
shared Marx's view that everything other than economic relations was
the superstructure of society. Although it differed from Marx in argu-ing that this superstructure was extremely important in understanding
mechanisms of social control, it ultimately relied on the same analysis
of the economic base for its critique. Critical legal studies scholars
concluded, quite correctly, that Marxism, and class analysis in general,
was a losing argument in the American context. To provide a meth-
odology for attacking the internal logic of legal decision making and
86 See HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 2, at 366-99(elucidating the role of Marxist thought in the development of critical theory); HELD,supra note 23, at 19-23 (describing the development of critical theory in the Marxisttradition); MARTIN JAY, MARXISM AND TOTAurY: THE ADVENTURES OF A CONCEPTFROM LUKACS TO HABERMAS 196-275 (1984) (describing the development of criticaltheory in the Marxist Frankfurt School); PHIL SLATER, ORIGIN AND SIGNIFICANCE OFTHE FRANKFURT SCHOOL: A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE 29 (1977) ("[l]t is the Marxian cri-tique that forms the cornerstone of critical theory of society."); WIGGERSHAUS, supranote 23, at 9-41 (recounting the role of Marxism in the formation of the FrankfurtSchool of critical theorists). In his Introduction to Adorno's Negative Dialectics, E.B.
Ashton says:
To follow the line of thought from detail to detail, you need to know Kantnear-perfectly, Hegel perfectly, and Marx-Engels viscerally-not just "by heart."If you twitch whenever a phrase in this book resembles one from the MarxistFounding Fathers, then and not until then can you think along with Adorno.
Introduction to ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS, supra note 23, at xii.
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scholarship in its entirety, they turned, instead, to deconstruction.
s'
This quickly proved to be a promiscuously corrosive instrument, how-
ever, since no legal argument has 
the logical density to withstand it.
u
Worse still, deconstruction lacked the kind of connection to American
politics that Marxism bore to European politics; there were many
names shouted in American streets during the stormy '60s and '70s,
butJacques Derrida and Paul deMan were not among them.
Both these defects were remedied by feminist theory"" and critical
race theory,"0 which abandoned deconstruction for a more socially
based critique that was connected with widely recognized issues 
in
American political life. Feminist and critical race theory, moreover,
raised the issue of personal identity, tracing the oppressive effects 
of
the dominant ideology on people's image of themselves, and not
merely on their political opinions. These theories tended to rely 
on a
false consciousness analysis, asserting that the dominant ideology 
con-
87 Most notably, they turned to Derrida. E.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins 
Univ. Press 1997)
(1967) (introducing deconstruction as a method of philosophy 
and criticism);
JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trins., 
Univ. of Chi. Press
1978) (1967) (using metaphysical deconstruction in a collection 
of essays analyzing
philosophical texts); see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES
(1987) (providing a self-critical assessment of the early critical 
legal studies move-
ment); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 
94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985) (employing deconstructive textual strategies to examine the 
inconsistencies of
contract doctrine); Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American 
Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1276 (1984) (critiquing American legal doctrine that causes 
bureaucracy);
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 
(1985) (considering
the construction of legal thought during the liberty of contract era); 
Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 
1 (1984) (reject-
ing the assertion that a rational foundation exists and is necessary for 
the development
of morals). For discussions on deconstruction, see GUYORA 
BINDER & ROBERT
WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISM OF LAw 378-461 (2000); J.M. Balkin, 
Deconstructive Prac-
tice and Legal Theoiy, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); and J.M. Balkin, Transcendental 
Deconstruc-
tion, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131 (1994).
88 See ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 130-71
(1990) (arguing that the critical legal studies claims concerning the 
doctrinal contra-
dictions of liberal legal theory depend on questionable ideas about 
social reality and
the structure of law); Donald F. Brosnan, Serious but Not Critical, 60 
S. CAL. L. REV. 259
(1987) (arguing that deconstruction is not fully convincing when 
applied to legal as
opposed to philosophical texts); Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism 
About Critical Le-
gal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505 (1987) (examining the implication 
of indetermi-
nacy upon critical legal studies); John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 
100 HARV. L.
REV. 332 (1986) (claiming that the nihilist critique is conceptual rather 
than empiri-
cal).
89 For examples of feminist theory, see supra note 41 (citing sources).
90 For examples of critical race theory scholarship, see supra note 40 (citing
sources).
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ceals people's real interests from themselves, and that this effect can
be combated by identity formation. Finally, these approaches focused
directly on the scholar's role as a situated human being, rather than a
detached observer who discerns eternal verities. This focus led to the
use of narrative in legal scholarship, where feminist and critical race
theorists would recount personal experiences or identify personal
emotions, and then use these as a source for their critique."'
Feminist theory and critical race theory have been extensively
criticized, by both sympathetic and hostile observers, as excessively
subjective,' 2 a charge which its proponents generally do not answer by
91
See, e.g., BELL, supra note 40 (using the story of a fictitious character named Ge-
neva Crenshaw as the basis for an examination of racial justice); RICHARD DELGADO,
THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995) (pre-
senting a discourse on critical race theory through a narrative from the perspective ofthe author's alter ego); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 1-7 (1987) (detailing the author's
personal rape experience to introduce an argument for changing the way the lawtreats "simple" rape); WILLIAMS, supra note 40 (examining the jurisprudence of rights
from the perspective of an African-American female law professor); Marie Ashe, Zig-
Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L.
REV. 355 (1989) (contextualizing an argument for the deregulation of pregnancy in adetailed account of the author's own birthing experience); Paulette M. Caldwell, A
Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (reacting
from a personal perspective to cases on the right to wear braided hair); Jerome
McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in
the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991) (describing the experience of being an
African-American law professor); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a
Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) (reacting personally to
the exclusion of minority legal scholarship); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women'sHedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S LJ.
81 (1987) (using narrative and anecdotal forms of writing to convey the different qual-
ity of women's hedonic lives); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills,
and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (providing
an example from the author's own legal work to illustrate race, gender, and class sub-
ordination).
92 See, e.g., BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 87, at 232-60 (analyzing the usefulness ofnarrative thinking in feminist theory to legal scholarship); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON 95-117 (1997) (criticizing the radical narrative movement's
hostility toward objective truths); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 971 (1991) (discussing the response to feminist narrative legal scholarship);Jane B.
Baron &Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1997) (advocating a story-
telling approach to legal analysis while doubting the possibility of objectivity and truth);
Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship,
81 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1995) (arguing in support of autobiographical narrative in scholar-ship, but acknowledging that the transformative impact may be greater on the storyteller
than on the legal culture); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School:
An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (discussing how to evaluate nar-
ratives considering problems such as the typicality of an author's personal experiences);
Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989) (analyzing the call to contextualize otherwise subjective
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denial, but in terms of the importance of identity in law and legal
scholarship. They developed this response in a largely American
narratives); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 
CEO. L.J. 251
(1992) (showing the need to improve the connection in legal stories for 
purposes of con-
stitutional adjudication).
The use of narrative in legal scholarship should be distinguished from 
the claim
that all legal discourse, including a judge's decisions, is a form of narrative. 
See, e.g.,
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS 
AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 231-74 
(1984) (inter-
preting historical texts in a narrative form); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme 
Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) ("[N]o 
set of legal
institutions or prescriptions exist apart from the narratives that locate 
it and give it
meaning."); Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game 
Theory, Narra-
tive Theory, and Feminist Theory, 2 YALEJ.L. & HuMAN. 37 (1989) (arguing 
that classical
property theory follows a narrative form); Robin West, Jurisprudence 
as Narrative: An
Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985) 
(claiming that
reading legal theory as narrative will allow theorists to realize their moral 
ideals). For
an illuminating account of the relationship between these two bodies 
of scholarship,
see BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 87, at 283-87.
93 SeeJane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 260 (1994) (explain-
ing that many stories told by feminist and critical race theorists recount 
real-life experi-
ences "which the law can respect or deny"); Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: 
The Law
Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 689 (1992) (suggesting that a study 
of the issues
raised by feminist and critical race theorists "may also help us understand 
the parallel
issues that traditional legal scholarship has too long elided"); Richard 
Delgado, Coughlin's
Complaint: How to Disparage Outsider Writing One Year Later, 82 VA. L. REV. 
95, 95 (1996)
(arguing that reading the autobiographies of women and writers of color 
can "provide
unique insights" and "enable the reader to see the world through another's 
eyes"); Rich-
ard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 
87 MICH. L. REV.
2411 (1989) (discussing the important constructive and deconstructive 
functions of
feminist and critical race theorist stories); Richard Delgado, When a Story Is 
Just a Story:
Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 95 (1990) (arguing that "voice" 
does matter
because many stories by feminists and scholars of color "reveal things about 
the world
that we ought to know"); William N. Eskridge,Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 607,
607 (1994) (asserting that "storytelling's value is in expanding legal debate 
and driving
social transformation by illuminating legal issues from the perspectives of 
nomic groups
frequently excluded from political and academic debate"); Mark Fajer, Authority, 
Credibil-
ity and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 
82 GEO. L.J.
1845 (1994) (explaining that women and writers of color, among others, 
must present
more complete and accurate versions of their lives due to the existence 
of pre-
understanding); Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Tales of White 
Folk: Doctrine,
Narrative, and the Reconstruction of Racial Reality, 84 CAL. L. REV. 377 (1996) 
(reviewing
RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995)); Alex M. Johnson, 
Jr., Defending
the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the 
Imposition of Process
h7eory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IowA L. REV. 803, 809 (1994) (arguing 
that critical race
theorists' narrative form "powerfully explicates legal issues"); Kim Lane 
Scheppele, Fore-
word: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) ("To make sense of 
law and to organ-
ize experience, people often tell stories. And these stories are telling.").
While these scholars often argue that the use of narrative in legal 
scholarship is
justified by the fact that all legal discourse, including a judge's decisions, 
is a form of
narrative, not all legal scholars who advance the latter claim necessarily 
rely on storytel-
2001]
40 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 150: 1
context; while relying on critical theory's seminal insight that law and
claims of neutrality in law could serve as means of oppression, they did
not return to critical theory for their connection to politics, their
analysis of identity, or their use of narrative.
The methodology of Continental social movement literature is
distinctly different from critical legal scholarship in the United States.
To begin with, it has retained contact with the Marxist analysis that
underlies critical theory. While few of the Continental scholars in this
field could be considered Marxists or even neo-Marxists, Marx's the-
ory of class conflict and his teleological concept of history provide an
intellectual framework for their work. This framework supports a fo-
cus on the structural aspects of society, such as the distribution of
wealth, the extent and character of urbanization, the shift from indus-
trial production to information, and the cultural impact of moderni-
zation. Some Continental social movement scholars, such as Klaus
Eder,: 4 continue to rely on traditional class analysis; others, such as
Hanspeter Kriesi 5 and Alain Touraine,' have argued that class divi-
ling as a methodology. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 92, at 231-74 (analyzing the Decla-ration of Independence, the Constitution, and Chief justice Marshall's opinion inMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and comparing the kinds ofcommunity and culture they each seek to establish); Cover, supra note 92 (illustratingthe relationship of law and narrative in the normative world through the use of biblicaltexts); Rose, sufpra note 92, at 39-40 (discussing the relation of property to storytelling
and describing "narrative as an exhortation to the listener to overcome a game-theoretic, self-interested 'nature,' and to follow instead the cooperative preference oforderings that a property regime requires"). There may well be differences, after all,between different types of narratives. For an illuminating account of the relationship
between these two bodies of scholarship, see BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 87, at
201-91.
See KLAUS EDER, T14E NEW POLITICS OF CLASS: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
CULTURAL DYNAMICS IN ADVANCED SOCIETIES (1993) (viewing class coalition and con-flict as the key for explaining social developments); Klaus Eder, Does Social Class Matter
in the Study of Social Movements? A Theoy of Middle Class Radicalism, in SOCIALMOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL CLASSES 21 (Louis Maheu ed., 1995) (concluding ultimately
that class does matter in the new social movements).
95 See KRIESI, supra note 24, at 52 (explaining that the "process ofintergenerational value change ... gradually transforms [a society's] politics and cul-tural norms," which in turn affects the society's class structure) (1993); HanspeterKriesi & Philip van PraagJr., Old and New Politics: The Dutch Peace Movement and the Tra-ditional Political Organizations, 15 EUR. J. POL. RES. 319, 320 (1987) (explaining that thenew social movements, such as the Dutch peace movement, "are carried by new socialstrata quite distinct from the working-class-by professionals from the new middlestrata-and directed towards the implementation of new, post-materialist values").
95 See ALAIN TOURAINE ET AL., SOLIDARITY: THE ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT:
POLAND 1980-81 (David Denby trans., 1983) (analyzing the Solidarity movement andits effects on the class structure in Poland); ALAIN TOURAINE ET AL., THE WORKERS'MOVEMENT, at xv (Ian Patterson trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1987) ("Our principal
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sions in society are being restructured along different lines by mod-
ernization; still others, such as Manuel Castells'
v and Alberto Me-
lucci,"'5 believe that the whole theory has ceased to account for con-
temporary developments. But all these scholars, including Castells
and Melucci, are centrally engaged in a debate about the role of social
class, and all employ a structural analysis that has its source in Marxist
class analysis.
A second, and in many ways conflicting theme that runs through
Continental social movement scholarship is an emphasis on individual
identity formation. This emphasis may be the principal theme that
distinguishes the Continental approach from the resource mobiliza-
tion perspective of American scholarship. The Continental concept
of identity is derived largely from phenomenology, with its analysis of
individual experience, intersubjective communication, and the social
construction of meaning. 9 According to Continental scholars, par-
ticipation in a social movement depends primarily on the individual's
identity, or sense of self.'00 To participate in a labor movement, one
hypothesis is that trade unionism is... a movement defined by its position within class
relations and which calls into question the social utilization of the productive forces of
industrial society."). See generally, TOURAINE, supra note 24, at xiii (presenting "the
general orientations of a sociology of action," developing a research method, and intro-
ducing "a set of interventions focussing primarily on social movements or struggles").
07 CASTELLS, supra note 24.
98 See MELUCCI, supra note 24, at 185-92 (reproducing excerpts of an interview with
the author in which he explains the inadequacy of the Marxian model of analysis for
understanding contemporary social movements); MELUCCI, supra note 27.
99 For basic statements of phenomenology, see EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF
THE EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (David Carr trans.,
i970); and EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS (W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., 1931). For the appli-
cation of phenomenology to social science, see 1 ALFRED SCHUTZ, COLLECTED PAPERS
(Maurice Natanson ed., 1973); and ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE
SOCIAL WORLD (George Walsh & Frederick Lehnert trans., 1967). Phenomenology is
the direct source of ethnomethodology. See HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY, at vii (1967) ("[T]he objective reality of social facts as an ongo-
ing accomplishment of the concerted activities of daily life ... . is the prevailing topic
for ethnomethodological study.").
100 CASTELLS, supra note 24; DELLA PORTA & DIANI, supra note 4, at 83-109;
ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY:
TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (Winston Moore & Paul Cammack trans.,
1985); MELUCCI, supra note 24; ALAIN TOURAINE, CAN WE LIVE TOGETHER? EQUALITY
AND DIFFERENCE 89-124 (David Macey trans., 2000); ALAIN TOURAINE, RETURN OF THE
ACTOR (Myrna Godzich trans., 1988); TOURAINE, supra note 24; Bert Klandermans &
Sjoerd Goslinga, Media Discourse, Movement Publicity, and the Generation of Collective Action
Frames: Theoretical and Empirical Exercises in Meaning Construction, in COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 30, at 312; Alberto Melucci, The
Global Planet and the Internal Planet: New Frontiers for Colective Action and Individual
Transformation [hereinafter Melucci, The Global Planet], in CULTURAL POLITICS, supra
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must see oneself as a worker rather than a future manager; to partici-
pate in an environmental movement, one may need to see oneself as
an urban resident, rather than a worker; to participate in a women's
movement, one must see oneself as a woman, rather than a wife. As
the examples indicate, these identities are dynamic and contingent.
They are not the unalterable consequence of some structural factor
such as one's economic status, as Marxist analysis would assert.
Rather, they result from a complex interaction of one's personal ex-
perience, one's cultural milieu, and one's pragmatic circumstances.
In short, they are socially constructed, and can change in response to
changes in the individual's external circumstances or personal atti-
tudes.
In order to constitute a social movement, people's individual
identities must possess a collective element. This point is obviously
necessary from a structural perspective, since only mass action is likely
to produce political or cultural effects, but it also involves complex
questions about the individual behavior that generates such action.
The resource mobilization approach treats this collective element as
the joint action or cooperation of individuals with pre-existing value
preferences. The Continental approach, however, emphasizes two
different, although generally interwoven, themes. First, participation
in a social movement is a dynamic process in which the individual
transforms and redefines herself in her interaction with others.0 "
Second, the movement as a whole develops a collective identity, an
emergent self-definition that functions analogously to the way that
self-definition functions for an individual. 2 The interplay between
the socially constructed identities of the individual and the movement
is mediated by various mechanisms. One such mechanism particularly
favored by Continental scholars is the social network of relationships
among individuals, itself both a pre-condition for social movements
note 20, at 287; Alberto Melucci, The Process of Collective Identity [hereinafter Melucci,The Process], in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE, supra note 27, at 41; Offe, supranote 24; Alessandro Pizzorno, Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Con-flict, in 2 THE RESURGENCE OF CLASS CONFLICT IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1968, at 277
(Colin Crouch & Alessandro Pizzorno eds., 1978).101 SeeMelucci, The Process, supra note 100, at 43 ("The actors 'produce' the collectiveaction because they are able to define themselves and their relationship with the envi-ronment. The definition that the actors construct is not linear but produced by interac-
tion, negotiation and the opposition of different orientations.").
Id. at 46-47 ("[C]ollective identity [is] the ability of a collective actor to recog-nize the effects of its actions and to attribute these effects to itself.... Collective iden-tity therefore defines the capacity for autonomous action, a differentiation of the actor
from others while continuing to be itself.").
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and a product of these movements.
10 3
Another less pervasive, but quite distinctive theme in Continental
social movement scholarship is the self-conscious concern with the
scholar's own role in the social movements that she studies. This is
probably derived from Weber's idea that the observer can only
achieve true understanding of social action by participating in the
meaning structure of that action. °4 The most striking, and in some
sense extreme response to this issue is Alain Touraine's. Abjuring the
103 See, e.g., DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE
AND THE STATE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ITALY AND GERMANY (1995) (comparing
the histories of political violence in Italy and Germany and explaining them from a
theory of mobilization, a theory of activism, and a theory of conflict); DIANI, supra note
7, at xiii (analyzing the Italian environmental movement and focusing on "the com-
plex set of exchanges-between organizations as well as between individuals-that ul-
timately make up a social movement"); MELUCCI, supra note 24; Mario Diani, Analysing
Social Movement Networks, in STUDYING COLLECTIVE ACTION 107 (Mario Diani & Ron
Eyerman eds., 1992) (outlining a framework for the empirical investigation of social
movement networks); Mario Diani, The Network Structure of the Italian Ecology Movement,
29 Soc. Sc. INFO. 5 (1990) (analyzing the network structure of the ecology movement
in Italy); Kriesi & van Praag, supra note 95 (analyzing the relationship between tradi-
tional organizations of political intermediation with the Dutch peace movement on the
local level); Dieter Rucht, Environmental Movement Organizations in West Germany and
France: Structure and Interorganizational Relationships, 2 INT'L SOC. MOVEMENT RES. 61
(1989). The use of networks as an explanatory mechanism is not limited to the Conti-
nental approach, however; resource mobilization scholars have also found it useful. See
DAVID A. SNOW, SHAKUBUKU: A STUDY OF THE NICHIREN SHOSHU BUDDHIST
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1960-1975 (1993) (emphasizing the role of social networks in
the propagation and recruitment practices of this religious movement); Debra Fried-
man & Doug McAdam, Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices and the Life of a
Social Movement, in FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 156 (analyzing the structural and ra-
tional choice accounts of participation in social movements, which locate "the causes
of activism in structural proximity and network connections" and engage in cost-
benefit calculations, respectively); David A. Snow et al., supra note 78 (asserting the
importance of social networks in accounting for differential recruitment in social
movements). In fact, networks can be added to frame analysis as a point of contact
between the two approaches.
104 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 8-22 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1968) (explaining in detail the two kinds of understanding: "direct observational
understanding of the subjective meaning of a given act as such" and "explanatory un-
derstanding"); MAX WEBER, "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE
METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. &
trans., 1949) (analyzing the Archiv and discussing in what sense there are "in general
'objectively valid truths' in those disciplines concerned with social and cultural phe-
nomena"); MAX WEBER, The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics, in
id. at 1, 1 (discussing "whether in teaching one should or should not declare one's ac-
ceptance of practical value-judgments, deduced from ethical principles, cultural ideals,
or a philosophical outlook"); see also FRITZ RINGER, MAX WEBER'S METHODOLOGY:
THE UNIFICATION OF THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 6 (1997) (analyzing
Weber's methodology and ultimately suggesting that "Weber's substantive achieve-
ments were thoroughly grounded in his methodological program").
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entire concept ofdetached observation, and even, at times, of obser-
vation at all, Touraine works directly with the groups he studies.05
The purpose of his work is to make group members aware of their
highest purpose, that is, the historical role that their movement occu-
pies. He does so by becoming a member of the group and then en-
gaging in regular discussion with group members to elevate their his-
torical consciousness. Alberto Melucci, while maintaining more
distance from the group, has employed a similar approach. He enters
into a contractual relationship with the group in which the group
agrees to provide information about its activities in exchange for his
assistance in the group's process of self-examination.' 6 The informa-
tion that the group provides concerns its actions, rather than its pub-
licly stated positions, and these actions are revealed as the group
works with the researcher.
As in the case of rational choice theory, American legal scholars
and Continental social movement scholars are using critical theory
rather differently. The legal scholars' concern with the internal logic
of the elite's controlling ideology is largely absent from Continental
social movement theory. Conversely, the Continental emphasis on so-
cial structure, and specifically on class conflict, is generally not found
in critical legal studies, feminism, or critical race theory. Feminism
and critical race theory seem to share the Continental concern with
identity, but their concept of recognizing or asserting one's true iden-
tity, and often doing so through narrative, is quite different from the
dynamic, socially constructed identity of Continental scholarship.' 7
105 See TOURAINE, supra note 24, at 21-28 (discussing anti-technocratic struggles);
ALAIN TOURAINE ET AL., ANTI-NUCLEAR PROTEST: THE OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR
ENERGY IN FRANCE (Peter Fawcett trans., 1983) (analyzing the antinuclear struggle in
France); TOURAINE ET AL., supra note 91 (analyzing the Solidarity movement in Po-
land). For discussions of this approach, see William Gamson, Review of Alain Touraine,
The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements, 88 AM.J. SoC. 812 (1983);
Dieter Rucht, Sociological Theory as a Theory of Social Movements? A Critique of Alain
Touraine, in RESEARCH ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 20, at 355, 373-79; and
Wolfgang Rudig & Philip Lowe, The Unfulfilled Prophecy: Touraine and the Anti-Nuclear
Movement, 20 MODERN & CONTEMP. FR. 19 (1984).
106 See Mario Diani & Alberto Melucci, The Growth of an Autonomous Research Field:
Social Movement Studies in Italy, in RESEARCH ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 20, at
149, 162-64 (describing the original methodological contribution made by Melucci in
the study on new forms of collective action in the Milan metropolitan area). The book
that provides a detailed account of one such project, ALTRI CODICI (Alberto Melucci
ed., 1984), does not appear to have been translated into English.
107 Certain jurisprudential works that have no particular relevance to social move-
ments make more direct use of the concept of identity that underlies the Continental
social movement scholarship. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities:
[Vol. 150: 1
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Some of the Continental writing on identity could be criticized for its
emphasis on, or praise of, subjectivity, but not for the subjectivity of its
technique; it speaks in the same theoretical voice as Continental struc-
turalism or systems theory. For American legal scholars, identity is a
truth that a person, including the scholar, discerns by escaping from
oppressive modes of thought; for Continental scholars, it is a creation
that one's subjects generate within a field of action. Finally, while
these two legal approaches and Continental social movement theory
also share a concern about the scholar's role, their methodologies for
addressing this issue are distinct. The legal scholars reach inward,
treating themselves as participants in order to document their own
experiences, which they then take to be typical, or at least indicative,
of some larger group's. In contrast, Continental social theorists reach
outward, joining or interacting with actual social movements in order
to inform themselves and simultaneously enlighten the group's mem-
bers through the scholar's superior theoretical understanding.
Once again, however, these methodological differences do not
seem sufficient to account for the relative insulation of social move-
ments scholarship and legal scholarship from one another. While the
Continental scholarship is heavily influenced by Marx, it is certainly
not Marxist. Some of it may be neo-Marxist, but the critical legal stud-
ies movement itself was inspired by the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School,
and many legal scholars not associated with this movement have made
extensive use of neo-Marxists, particularly Juirgen Habermas
°s The
differences in the way legal scholars and Continental social movement
scholars approach identity are significant, but the two are talking
about the same thing, nonetheless. Race is a distinctively American
issue, but feminism is a shared concern, l°' and one might expect that
Toward aJurisprudence of Identity, 61 CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1220 (1994) (discussing the idea
of constructing both selves and collectivities out of social roles).
108 See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory
and Its Audience, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 569, 575 (1992) (using Habermas's distinction
between two kinds of discursive social action, "communicative action" and "strategic
communication"); William E. Forbath, Habernas's Constitution: A I-hstory, Guide, and
Critique, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 969, 972 (1998) (analyzing the strengths and weak-
nesses of Habermas's theories from a legal and social perspective); Francis J. Mootz,
11I, Psychotherapeutic Practice as a Model for Postmodern Legal Theory, 12 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 299, 327-45 (2000) (criticizing as unsuccessful Habermas's attempt to "psy-
choanalyze" society); Edward Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theoly for Evaluating Legal
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 889 (1992) (applying the epistemological approach of
modern continental philosophers, including Habermas, to recommend criteria on
which scholarship can be judged).
1(y. For legal sources, see supra note 41. For social movement literature, see THE
NEW WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: FEMINISM AND POLITICAL POWER IN EUROPE AND THE USA
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this specific issue would provide an entry for American legal scholars
into the extensive Continental literature on identity formation. Fi-
nally, the narrative technique of American feminist and critical race
theorists is not found on the Continent, but it is at least homologous
to the phenomenological basis of Continental scholarship. In short,
important differences are present, but they do not seem important
enough to explain the remarkable extent to which Continental social
movement theorists and legal scholars have been uninterested in each
other's work.
III. SUBJECT MATTER DIVERGENCES
A. The Nature of the Divergence
If methodological differences cannot account for the mutual iso-
lation of legal scholarship and social movement scholarship, then the
explanation may be found in the differences between the subject mat-
ters of these two fields. At first sight, they seem to overlap considera-
bly, but more detailed consideration reveals a marked divergence.
This can be seen by separating a social movement into its existence
and its actions.
As described in the preceding section, social movement scholar-
ship, particularly when the American and Continental versions are
taken together, addresses every aspect of a social movement's exis-
tence. It describes the preconditions, both individual and social, for
the creation of a movement. It also addresses the way movements
form, discussing individual motivations, both rational and identity-
based, the importance of social networks and individual capacities, the
role of leaders or policy entrepreneurs, and the external circum-
stances, such as political developments or dramatic incidents, that can
play a catalytic role. The growth and continuation of movements have
also received extensive attention. The resource mobilization approach
has studied the way movements retain the loyalty of their members,
obtain funds and volunteer work, and make use of political opportu-
nities, media coverage, and alliances with other organizations. Conti-
nental social theory has studied the way movements express or create
(Drude Dahlerup ed., 1986); and Mario Diani & Alberto Melucci, The Growth of an
Autonomous Research Field: Social Movement Studies in Italy, in RESEARCH ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, supra note 15, at 149, 158-59 (1991). See generally THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENTS, supra note 16, at 3-20 (comparing the feminist movements of the United
States and Western Europe).
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the identities of its members, how they interact with the social struc-
ture, and how they contribute to the historical development of the so-
ciety. Both traditions discuss the institutionalization of social move-
ments, and the changes in their commitments over time. Finally,
there has been at least some discussion of the way social movements
dissipate or are destroyed, thus completing the consideration of their
life cycle.11°
Discussion of the actions social movements undertake seems
equally comprehensive. Virtually every kind of social movement has
been studied, from pro-environment to anti-abortion, from human
rights to animal rights, from bread-and-butter labor movements to
quiche-and-cappuccino save-the-panda efforts. Attention has been fo-
cused on internal management and external action, on violent pro-
test, peaceful protest, alliance formation, and on certain aspects of
litigation and law reform efforts. There is, however, one aspect of ac-
tion that does not appear to have been addressed by social scientists in
much detail. This aspect is the substance of litigation and law reform
efforts, the specific legal arguments that advocates for social move-
ments advance in judicial proceedings, and the specific statutory lan-
guage that they propose in legislative lobbying. The general position
that the movement adopts has been extensively considered, but the
particular litigation and legislative strategies of its agents have not."
110 See GAMSON, supra note 22, at 30-31 (describing three main conditions under
which a period of challenge ends); Kim Voss, The Collapse of a Social Movement: The In-
terplay of Mobilization Structures, Framing, and Political Opportunities in the Knights of Labor,
in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 30, at 227, 251-54
(explaining how some of the framing and organizational innovations that brought
about the Knights of Labor social movement later contributed to the movement's de-
cline).
I It is difficult to demonstrate a negative by specific citation. One simplistic, but
revealing observation is that most leading monographs and edited volumes in the so-
cial movement literature do not include the terms "law," "legal system," or "legislation"
in their indices. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra
note 30, at 419 (making no references to these terms); CULTURAL POLITICS, supra note
20, at 355 (same); EYERMAN & JAMISON, supra note 27, at 183 (same); SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE, supra note 27 (same); TARROW, supra note 21, at 247
(same); SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 428
(same); cf DELLA PORTA-& DIANI, supra note 4, at 323 (making two references to law
and order, one involving unpoliced urban areas, the other involving coalitions favoring
law and order); FRONTIERS, supra note 21, at 378 (making one reference to the legali-
zation of protest by democratic regimes). Of these works, only one, edited by Mayer
Zald and John McCarthy, cites Handler. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL
SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 426. Even here, and despite the fact that Mayer Zald wrote
the introduction to Handler's book, supra note 18, there are only two references, both
attached to brief acknowledgments that social movement organizations sometimes rely
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Turning to legal scholarship, one finds a much less extensive con-
sideration of social movements. Very little is said about the existence
of social movements; their formation, operation, continuation, and
decline are all regarded as beyond the scope of legal scholarship.
With respect to the actions of social movements, there is virtually no
discussion of their internal management, their use of protest, or even
the development of their litigation and law reform efforts. In fact,
only one aspect of social movements appears in legal literature-the
substance of these litigation and law reform efforts, the specific legal
arguments that advocates for social movements advance in judicial
proceedings, and the specific statutory language that they propose in
legislative lobbying. This is true even of Joel Handler's book, which
declares an interest in social movement literature, but provides only a
brief, historical summary of each movement before proceeding to its
analysis of the legal cases that each movement initiated."' In other
on litigation. See SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 4, at
259 ("The most highly structured type of an encounter setting is probably the court.");
id. at 310 (noting that "specific acts of legislation may make courts more or less avail-
able as avenues for social movement action").
112 See HANDLER, supra note 18, at 43-188 (examining the attempts of social move-
merits to use the court system to bring about change in three areas of the law-envi-
ronmental protection, consumer protection, civil rights, and social welfare). The goal
of Handler's book is to identify the factors that secure success in public interest litiga-
tion. Id. at 1-5, 34-41. Handler identifies five such factors: the characteristics of the
social reform group that is initiating the litigation, the distribution of benefits and
costs from the litigation, the extent to which the decision or settlement must be im-
plemented by an administrative agency, the effectiveness ofjudicial remedies, and the
legal resources available to the reform group. Id. at 5-34. The last three factors are
internal to the legal system and are commonly included in discussions of institutional
reform litigation. See MALCOLM FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 297-323
(1998) (arguing that judges are active policymakers and will continue to be so in the
modern administrative state); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1300-02 (1976) (concluding that the involvement of courts
and judges in public law litigation is a necessary and unavoidable part of seeking jus-
tice in a regulated society); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The
Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-17 (1979) (arguing thatjudges are in the best po-
sition of all the agents of government to interpret the values of the Constitution, but
are constrained in doing so). The distribution of the costs and benefits factor is de-
rived from James Q. Wilson, not from social movements literature, see WILSON, supra
note 53, at 331 (distinguishing between concentrated and widely distributed benefits,
and between concentrated and widely distributed costs), and has been used fairly ex-
tensively in legal scholarship, see, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFEcT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 53-97 (1994) (pre-
senting a "two-force" model to predict the conditions under which concentrated inter-
ests will have an advantage over dispersed interests); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275, 338 (1988) (arguing that public choice theory, which uses economic princi-
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words, the only aspect of social movements that legal scholarship dis-
cusses is the only aspect of social movements that social science litera-
ture does not. 1 3 That is the reason why there is very little overlap in
the subject matter of their discussions.
We can imagine the social scientist assiduously following the ca-
reer of a social movement such as environmentalism. She observes
the way the movement forms-the triggering events such as the bio-
logical destruction of a river, the first efforts to organize public pro-
tests, the emergence of leaders, the tentative efforts at building or-
ganizations. She then tracks the way the movement develops, the way
it mobilizes resources to create permanent, politically effective institu-
tions, or the way it redefines the identity of its members as environ-
mentalists and secures their continuing loyalty. Having done so, she
can document the actions that the movement undertakes, such as
continued protest, public education, recruitment, and, most signifi-
cantly for present purposes, litigation and legislative or administrative
lobbying. With respect to these last activities, the social scientist traces
the way they are selected as strategies by the movement's organiza-
tions, the particular issues that they address, the content of these is-
sues, and the way the organization manages them. In effect, she fol-
pies to analyze the political process, is a useful tool of statutory analysis because of its
insight into the evolution of statutes). This leaves the first factor; while Handler does
cite to social movements literature, the thrust of his discussion involves the free-rider
problem, as developed by Olson. See HANDLER, supra note 18, at 5-14 (noting that O1-
son's theory of the free rider is the starting point for all social reform groups). While
this indicates that he shares a common source of inspiration with social movement
scholars, it does not represent an incorporation. of their work, and, generally speaking,
no such incorporation is made. Handler does not explore the ways that movements
overcome the free-rider problem; rather, he takes the existence of that problem as an
impediment to the success of the law reform effort.
113 In addition to Handler, see MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-50 (1987); and Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering
Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 411 (2000). Seidenfeld's article discusses the effect of "public interest groups" on
the collaborative governance strategies that have evolved in administrative law. While
he does cite some social movement literature, see, e.g., Walker, supra note 62 (address-
ing the mobilization of political interests), most of his sources are discussions of inter-
est groups, and he tends to assimilate social movements to an interest group model, see
infra note 162 (citing sources that discuss an interest group model). Tushnet's book
differs from most legal scholarship in that it discusses litigation as the coordinated
strategy of an organization, not as a series of doctrinally connected cases. But he deals
with the NAACP as an existing organization, rather than the product of a social move-
ment, and his main concern with the NAACP involves its use of litigation and its rela-
tionship with the Garland Fund. TUSHNET, supra, at 1-20. While Tushnet is aware of
the social movement literature, see id. at 167 n.6 (listing various studies on resource
mobilization theory), he does not see it as relevant to his subject of inquiry.
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lows the movement's litigators and lobbyists to the courthouse door,
to the entrance to the legislative drafting room, or to the glass and
metal door of the administrative agency. And at that point she loses
sight of them.
On the other side of the door to the court, the legislature, or the
agency is the legal scholar. She observes the movement's litigators
and lobbyists as they enter, listens to their arguments, and notes their
effectiveness in winning their case or influencing the public policy-
maker. She attends to the precise claims that they advance in court,
and also attends, albeit less assiduously, to the language of their statu-
tory proposals. While she knows where these well-informed, well-
funded representatives have come from-what organizations have
provided them with information and funding-she tends not to exam-
ine the nature of these organizations, or the organic connection be-
tween them and their representatives. For some scholars, the lawyers
and lobbyists are simply representatives of interest groups, like the
representatives of the chemical or timber industry who oppose-- 114
them. For others, they are public-spirited attorneys, animated by a
commitment to justice, and funded by some like-minded organiza-
tion. But the processes that have generated these organizations, the
114 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR:
OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-
SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 24-25 (1981) (de-
scribing the role of lawyers representing environmental interest groups in environ-
mental litigation); Macey, supra note 51, at 1-3 (arguing that the passage of legislation
can be motivated entirely by a desire to protect an interest group and that the judiciary
simply executes the legislature's will as long as a statute is constitutional); Eric A. Pos-
ner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective
Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 144-65 (1996) (asserting that group norms play a
greater role in shaping rules of conduct than do laws or the lawyers who represent in-
terest groups in legal disputes); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 49 (1985) ("It is clear that constituent pressures play a significant
role in many legislative decisions and that the federalist ideal of national responsibility
to a national constituency does not exist in practice.").
115 See, e.g., GERALD P. L6PEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 13 (1992) (describing a lawyer for Advocates for Justice as
"thoroughly dedicated to winning legal rights for the poor, people of color, and other
oppressed groups"); BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYsIs 81-106 (1978) (testing the hypothesis that
public interest lawyers have more of a desire for work in which they can represent the
interests of the poor than for high monetary income); Oliver Houck, With Charity for
All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1441 (1984) (noting that public interest organizations and their
lawyers "did not simply seek compensation for their clients; increasingly they sought to
change the law"); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 210 (1976) ("[T]he existence-as well as the success-of
[public interest] organizations undoubtedly influenced the budding public interest
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social movements that lie behind them, are part of the great outdoors
of social science that is deemed to lie beyond the bounds of legal
scholarship.
Social scientists and legal scholars are, then, studying the very
same movements. While there are probably social movements that ig-
nore the political sphere-one example that comes to mind is Trek-
kies-the great majority, and certainly the great majority that social
scientists have studied, are deeply committed to law reform. The law
reform-oriented groups, of course, are precisely the ones that legal
scholars observe in their discussions of litigation, legislation, and ad-
ministrative action. But the two groups of scholars stand on either
side of the courthouse, legislative, or agency door; while they see the
same movement, they do not see each other. Their isolation is pre-
served because neither group attempts to follow their subjects
through that door. Social scientists do not involve themselves in the
technical, seemingly arcane details of legal doctrine, legislative draft-
ing, or administrative rulemaking. And legal scholars do not venture
into the chaotic, empirical world of mobilization, recruitment, politi-
cal strategy, and organizational behavior.
B. The Causes of the Divergence
1. Legal Scholarship in General
What is the cause of this disjunction between the social science
study of social movements and the legal study of the judicial decisions,
legislation, and administrative decisions that these movements influ-
ence? With respect to social science, the primary cause appears to be
a failure, or refusal, to attach independent importance to legal doc-
trine, statutory language, and the details of administrative regulations.
The general view seems to be that the content of decisions, statutes, or
regulations is purely epiphenomenal; it is the product of the judge's
or the policymaker's attitudes, and nothing more.11 6 These attitudes
law movement as its founders struggled to create a viable form for achieving law re-
form through litigation.").
116 This is clearly true of general studies of the legislative and executive process.
See, e.g., RIcHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1-14 (1973) (contend-
ing that the policies of congressional committees are the result of committee members
furthering their personal political goals); JOHN KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING
DECISIONS 5 (3d ed. 1989) (reporting the results of an empirical study examining the
factors influencing congressional representatives' voting decisions, including their
sources of information, vote cues, constituents, interest groups, and administration);
ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 3-31 (1983) (describing how rela-
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themselves have complex causes, of course. They can result from per-
sonal predilection, ideology, rational computation of personal advan-
tage, or the desire to be respected by one's colleagues. But once these
causes have been canvassed, the explanation is generally regarded as
complete. Neither legal reasoning, judicial precedent, the rules of
legislative drafting, or the strategies for designing effective statutes
and regulations are regarded as relevant considerations.
This view of legal doctrine and statutory drafting might seem
natural for social scientists like Mancur Olson, who restrict human
motivation to the maximization of material self-interest."7 From this
perspective, doctrine can be little more than a facade for underlying
economic interests. As discussed above, however, most social scien-
tists, including those who have developed the social movements litera-
ture, reject this view. For them, the ideological beliefs of individuals
and the content of the ideas expressed by social movements are cru-
tions between the President and Congress control congressional decision making);
WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LEGISLATURE 201 (1982) (commenting that "the risks of legisla-
tive reform had to be undertaken by leaders as an act of selflessness, for the honor of
it"); cf NELSON W. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY (4th ed. 1986) (" [I] n order
to understand contemporary policymaking by Congress and the Presidency, it is neces-.
sary to know that they bargain and search for coalitions."). It is equally true of works
that recount the history of specific statutes. See STEPHEN KEMP BAILEY, CONGRESS
MAKES A LAW: THE STORY BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946, at 235-40 (1950)
(hypothesizing that congressional representatives' reactions to national policies are
based at least in part on their personal histories and pressures from their home con-
stituencies); SIIERI 1. DAVID, WITH DIGNITY: THE SEARCH FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
17-47 (1985) (describing the struggles both within and between the House and Senate
during the debate over the passage of Medicare and Medicaid); JOHN A. FEREJOHN,
PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS LEGISLATION 1947-1968, at 129-94
(1974) (examining how congressional policymaking is influenced by institutions such
as the committee system, the seniority system, and the process of authorization and
appropriations); ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 98-162 (1973) (describing
the political debates over the passage of the National Health Services Corporations
Act). It is also true for social scientists who study courts. See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN
& THOMAS P. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 190 (3d ed. 1985)
(noting that a judge may act in a way "which manifest[s] his perceptions of what he
ought to and can do (as well as the converse) as a judge"); DAVID W. ROHDE &
HAROLDJ. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 137-45 (1976) (describing val-
ues that motivate the actions of the Justices); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL
MIND: THE ATTIITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURTJUSTICES, 1946-1963, at
22-43 (1965) (asserting an attitudinal theory of judicial decision making); JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLDJ. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65
(1993) ("[T]he Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis
the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.").
117 See OLSON, supra note 21, at 60-65 (describing how even social incentives are
motivating as individual, non-collective goods).
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cial to an understanding of their subject matter.11 Most contempo-
rary social scientists regard symbol systems, cultural values, and discur-
sive practices as independent and important forces that shape socialS 19
behavior."' But when they confront legal doctrine, statutory lan-
guage, and the detailed provisions of administrative regulations, they
seem to abandon this approach and to embrace the reductionist
stance that they reject in other areas. One possible reason why they
do so is that legal doctrine and statutory language, unlike other dis-
cursive or symbolic practices, self-consciously proclaim their own im-
portance, while traditional political authorities support these asser-
tions with their own self-conscious declarations. For a social scientist
to assert their importance, therefore, hardly seems like much of a dis-
covery. Scholars want, above all, to say something new. Their de-
valuation of legal doctrine may simply represent the familiar pattern
in which the interesting defeats the obvious.
Of greater relevance for purposes of this discussion is the reason
why legal scholars have paid so little attention to the origins of the
litigation and lobbying efforts that they have studied, and that have
exercised such profound effects on the law. The most general answer
is that legal scholarship is predominantly prescriptive. As I have ar-
118 See supra text accompanying notes 52-54 (discussing how, under critical theory,
belief systems are the mechanisms of social control).
H9 See, e.g., COHEN & ARATO, supra note 2, at 2-3 (arguing that the current "dis-
course of civil society," which focuses on non-class-based forms of collective action,
drives change in contemporary political culture); RANDALL COLLINS, CONFLICT
SOCIOLOGY 89 (1975) (describing social behavior in terms of the conflict approach,
which provides that people act to their greatest advantage in light of the resources
available to them); WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 211-47
(3d ed. 1993) (arguing that the language of politics is an institutionalized structure of
meanings that guides political behavior and thinking in society); CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973) (advancing an interpretive theory of cul-
ture in assessing the impact of culture on human behavior); ANTHONY GIDDENS,
CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY 9-48 (1979) (offering a critical analysis of struc-
turalism and the theory of the subject); VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS AND
METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC ACTION IN HUMAN SOCIETY 23-59 (1974) (examining how
metaphors and paradigms conceived of by the social actor influences the actor's behav-
ior).
120 See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) (discussing the recom-
mendations of legal academia on how to conduct judicial review); Richard Delgado,
Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 933 (1991) (stating that the predominant mode of legal scholarship is normative
in orientation); George Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970 (1981)
(explaining the conflicting modes of thought of the legal scholarship, advocacy and
neutrality); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990) (il-
lustrating how the law is a product of normative legal thought); Pierre Schlag, Norma-
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gued elsewhere, its defining theme is the effort to frame recommen-
dations to public decision makers about the proper way for them to
carry out their role. 2 From this perspective, the essentially descrip-
tive enterprise of social science is of secondary interest. Judges are
supposed to decide contested cases on the basis of legal reasoning
from authoritative sources, and can be criticized, or, less commonly,
congratulated, on the basis of their ability to carry out this task cor-
rectly. Legislators and administrators are supposed to frame public
policy on the basis of theirjudgment about the best way to achieve so-
cial welfare or some similar, public-oriented goal, and can be criti-
cized or congratulated for their choice of goal or strategy. Neither of
these scholarly enterprises depends on a descriptive account of the in-
terests that attempt to influence these decision-making processes.
This explanation for legal scholars' lack of interest in social
movements does not seem complete, however. Surely, prescription
cannot be undertaken in a vacuum; one would imagine that scholars
could only benefit from knowing something about the social move-
ments that were generating many of the cases that judges adjudicate
and much of the policymaking in which legislators and administrators
engage. By drawing from the social movement literature, scholars
might be able to augment their prescriptive efforts; they might be able
to provide these public decision makers with a deeper understanding
of the forces that act on them. Public policy analysts also define their
field by taking a prescriptive stance that is similar to that of legal
scholars, but they have been much more open to the descriptive ef-
forts of social scientists.
One possible reason why legal scholars have remained insulated
from social science scholarship such as the social movement literature
is that their prescriptive stance is overlain by a closely related, but
logically independent perspective. They direct a disproportionate
amount of their prescriptions to judges,"' and adapt their methodol-
tivity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 808 (1991) [hereinafter Schlag,
Normativity] ("The orientation of American academic legal thought is pervasively and
overwhelmingly normative."); Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90
YALE LJ. 1205 (1981) (discussing the normative nature of legal scholarship).
121 See Edward Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 521, 522
(arguing that legal scholarship provides recommendations and prescriptions to legal
decision makers); Edward Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH.
L. REv. 1835, 1848 (1988) [hereinafter Rubin, Practice and Discourse] (asserting that a
"prescriptive voice distinguishes legal scholarship from most other academic fields").
122 See Charles Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining
the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 1991 DuKE L.J. 191 (analyzing the
relationship between legal scholarship and the judiciary); Sanford Levinson, The Audi-
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ogy to that ofjudges in what I have called a "unity of discourse. 2  In
other words, legal scholarship may be described as suffering from ju-
rocentrism.12  The result is a mind set in which an analysis of social
movements is regarded not only as irrelevant, but as vaguely im-
proper. Litigants present themselves to a court on the basis of their
relevant factual assertions and attendant legal arguments; their iden-
tity and social origins are supposed to be irrelevant. The court, receiv-
ing these decontexualized litigants, evaluates their evidence and ar-
guments and then proceeds to decide the case on the merits.
Whether this is really true of courts is, of course, an open question; 12
it is, nevertheless, clearly a well-established aspirational norm in our
society.
When legal scholars base their methodology on judicial discourse,
they tend to adopt and internalize this norm. They will regard the so-
cial origin of the conflicting positions on an issue-all those actions
that occur on the far side of the courthouse door-as irrelevant to
their own assessment. What will matter to them is the legal validity of
the arguments that these conflicting positions reflect, the extent to
which they can be justified by legal reasoning on the basis of authori-
ence for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or Why, and to Whom, Do I Write the Things IDo?), 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 389 (1992) (discussing the difference between the practices of legal
academics and judges); Rubin, Practice and Discourse, supra note 121, at 1847 (stating
that the purpose of standard legal scholarship is to influence legal decision makers);
Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1627 (1991) [hereinafter
Schlag, Problem of the Subject] (discussing rules of interpretation promulgated by legal
scholars, whose purpose is to constrain the judiciary); Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 421 (1992) ("[T]he prototypical Langdellian practice of writ-
ing for judges is increasingly beset with a kind of demoralization-a sense of futility
and aimlessness.").
123 Rubin, Practice and Discourse, supra note 121, at 1859-65.
124 The most notorious example of jurocentric scholars is Ronald Dworkin, who
consistently expands rules for judicial decision making into general theories of law. See
RONALD DwORKIN, LAw'S EMPIRE 2 (1986) (stating that "the law often becomes what
judges say it is," and thus has broad and far-reaching ramifications); RONALD
DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977) (arguing that the process of judi-
cial decision making should be aimed at discovering our basic rights). Richard Cap-
palli describes this approach as the "legal method." Richard Cappalli, The Disappear-
ance of the Legal Method, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 395-96 (1997). Cappalli maintains that it
is in decline in major law schools, id. at 395; his argument here is that its prior domi-
nance continues to affect the approach of legal scholars, even when they no longer
accept it.
For arguments that it is not an open question, at least not all the time, see
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 112, at 297-335; Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Pub-
lic Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Meir Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic Organi-
zations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1985); Fiss, supra note 112;
and Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the CivilProcess, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1975).
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tative sources. Of course, legal scholars have long recognized that
courts do not necessarily decide cases solely on the basis of legal rea-
soning, but that they also engage in policy analysis. Courts try to de-
cide -what is best for society, and then dress up their conclusion in the
raiments of legal reasoning, or, less hysterically, integrate their policy
judgments into the constraints imposed by legal reasoning. Even
more to the point, legal scholars have recognized that their own pre-
scriptions for best deciding a case should be informed by policy con-
siderations; that is, they have recognized that they should adopt the
more policy-oriented style of judicial discourse."' But even this
awareness has not induced them to go through the courthouse door
and explore the social origins of the conflicting views. Rather, the ju-
rocentrism of legal scholars leads them to assimilate policy-based as-
sessments of litigants' positions to the judicial decision-making model.
The litigants who come through the door present alternative policies
to the decision maker, as well as alternative doctrinal arguments.
These proposed policies are, however, assessed by the legal scholars in
the same way that legal arguments are assessed-on their merits, and
without regard to their origin.
Having employed this judicialized discourse for the policy argu-
126 See PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (analyzing the
factors Justices consider when interpreting the Constitution); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 10 (1994) (asserting that "statutory inter-
preters in the United States routinely consider originalist factors, including statutory
precedents, postenactment legal and social developments, and current values and so-
cial needs"); FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 112, at 2 (stating that judges "are willing to
acknowledge that they use social policy to inform interpretation, but usually insist that
their interpretation, whatever its sources, constitutes the most valid reading of the
text"); ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 15-18 (1995) (discussing the nature
of constitutional adjudication); CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 111-59 (1990) (discussing various approaches
to statutory interpretation, of which public policy considerations is one); Chayes, supra
note 125, at 1309 (asking whether "the disinterestedness of the judge [can] be sus-
tained, for example, when he is more visibly part of the political process"); Fiss, supra
note 112, at 9 (arguing that the proper function of a judge is not to become involved
in interest group politics); Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. REv. 703, 706 (1975) (stating that a broad view ofjudicial review accepts "the
courts' additional role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty
and fair treatment").
127 One could cite, as examples, a large proportion of modern legal scholarship
including all of law and economics. The ubiquity of this stance is perhaps most clearly
indicated by critiques of it. See, e.g., Cappalli, supra note 124, at 444 ("Are we all merely
politicians making false claims to reason and craft as tools to subjugate the masses?");
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Prqfes-
sion, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (asserting that law schools emphasize abstract theory
over practical scholarship).
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ments that are presented in litigation, or that are relevant to litigation,
it is natural enough for legal scholars to adopt the same judicialized
discourse when dealing with explicit public policymaking, that is, the
drafting of statutes and regulations. Here, too, their general stance is
that scholars should evaluate the arguments that lobbyists present to
legislators or administrators on their own merits, as policy proposals,
rather than treating some of them as the product of social move-
ments. The policymaker, like the judge, ought to be a neutral deci-
sion maker according to this point of view. He should attend to the
arguments of lobbyists in order to inform himself about the alterna-
tive solutions to the problem at hand, but he should then use his own
judgment to select the best solution, without taking further considera-
tion of its origin.
Whether policymakers actually behave in this manner is not an
open question; everyone agrees that they do not. But the idea of
evaluating policy alternatives on their merits, without attending to
their social origin, is a well-established aspirational norm in our soci-
ety, almost as well-established as the equivalent norm forjudicial deci-
sion making. Certainly, it is a norm for scholars who are framing rec-
ommendations to policymakers. The idea of evaluating proposals on
their merits is regarded as virtually equivalent to the idea of rational
decision making, which is the primary basis on which a scholar can
address a government official. Public policy scholars frequently adopt
this same norm, although not as frequently as legal scholars.12 Thus,
there is much to be said for the legal scholar's approach to policy ar-
guments, despite its jurocentric origins. The inevitable result of this
approach, however, is the legal scholar's lack of interest in the social
origins of lobbyists' positions, and in the social movements that repre-
sent an important part of these origins.
128 See, e.g., STUART NAGEL, POLICY EVALUATION: MAKING OPTIMAL DECISIONS
(1982) (discussing the ways in which policy is formulated and evaluated); CARL
PATTON & DAVID SAWICKI, BASIC METHODS OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING 24 (2d
ed. 1993) (arguing that "prescriptive policy analysis involves displaying the results of
analysis and making a recommendation"); EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A
PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 3 (1978) ("The approach to policy analysis throughout
this Primer is that of the rational decision maker who lays out goals and uses logical
processes to explore the best way to reach those goals."); AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING
TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS 12-13 (1979) (asserting
that "[n]o one can do analysis without becoming aware that moral considerations are
integral to the enterprise").
2001]
58 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
2. Public Choice and Critical Studies
The jurocentric approach to legal scholarship is best exemplified
by the legal process school. Public choice and critical studies, or out-
sider scholarship, as the primary antagonists of legal process, might
have been expected to avoid this approach and to have placed them-
selves in a position to assimilate some of the lessons of the social
movements scholarship. This would seem particularly true because
these two bodies of legal scholarship, as described above, were pre-
cisely the ones that drew upon the same methodologies that inspired
the social movements field. But neither public choice nor critical le-
gal studies was able to escape from the jurocentric style of legal proc-
ess; as so often is the case, they tended to shape themselves in the im-
age of their enemies.
In opposition to legal process, public choice asserted that legisla-
tion and regulation were controlled by interest groups, and that legal
changes did not reflect efforts to benefit the public, but only efforts to
maximize the material self-interest of the decision makers who cater
to well-organized special interests. But this assertion was not moti-
vated by any particular curiosity about the origin or character of spe-
cial interest groups. Rather, what motivated public choice was, at least
in part, the desire to discredit legal process, to reveal Wechsler, Bickel,
Fuller, Hart and Sacks as a group of deluded Pollyannas.3 0 Beyond
this lay the grander, but no less combative aspiration of discrediting
the regulatory process and perhaps the entire administrative state.
For this purpose, it was enough that interest groups existed; there was
little more that needed to be said about them. Consequently, public
choice scholars did not concern themselves with the mobilization, or-
ganization, and action strategies of the special interest groups to
which they attributed such profound effects. They simply assumed
that there would be an effective lobby representing any special inter-
est. They further assumed that any effect that can be theoretically at-
tributed to special interest influence is in fact the product of such in-
fluence. Thus, they were not investigating the actual behavior and
effect of special interests, or any other social movement, but were hy-
pothesizing those behaviors and effects from their study of the legisla-
tion itself. For public choice scholars, therefore, the role of special
interests was not a subject of empirical observation, but an interpretive
29 See supra note 51 (citing sources).
30 On the relationship between law and economics and the legal process school,
see Rubin, supra note 39, at 1398-400.
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device, an influence whose existence they assumed from their exami-
nation of legislative language and design.
The result of this approach was that public choice scholars re-
mained on the inside-the doctrinal side-of the courthouse, legisla-
ture, and agency doors. It was sufficient for their purposes that spe-
cial interest lobbyists came through the door and presented their
arguments to the decision makers within. In fact, public choice schol-
ars did not even watch the lobbyists come through the door; they
conducted very few empirical studies about the impact of special in-
terest groups. Instead, they simply assumed, by observing the nature
of the decisions that were reached, that the lobbyists had had some
impact. The primary thrust of their critique had nothing to do with
the nature of the lobbyists, but with the reaction of the decision mak-
ers. While they were willing to assume that courts could remain neu-
tral in the face of partisan arguments, they believed, in contrast to le-
gal process scholars, that legislators and administrators could not do
so. In assuming that any economic interest would generate an effec-
tive lobbying organization, public choice scholars were on reasonably
safe empirical ground, although they themselves did not undertake
the empirical work, or even attend to the empirical work of others in
much detail. But this assumption, and thejurocentric perspective that
gave rise to it, led them astray in another area. As stated above, public
choice scholars, having accepted Olson's free-rider hypothesis in its
entirety, were inclined to under-emphasize the ability of diffuse, ideo-
logically motivated groups to mobilize. When the evidence became
irresistible, they made the assumption that these groups were equiva-
lent to special economic interests. In part, this was the result of their
reluctance to concede the existence of noneconomic motivations.
But a contributing factor was simply their tendency to regard all lob-
byists as equivalent to one another. The environmentalists, animal
rights activists, and consumer representatives who came through the
legislator's or administrator's door were regarded as essentially the
same as the business interests they opposed. In fact, if one were lo-
cated exclusively on the inside of that door, they did not look very dif-
ferent; they were professional lobbyists, arguing their position with in-
telligence and single-mindedness. Only if one were to peer through
the door, if one paid attention to the work of the social movement
scholars, would one perceive that these lobbyists came from organiza-
tions with very different origins and that these origins implied very dif-
ferent social consequences.
Critical legal studies and its successors, which are sometimes
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called outsider scholarship, and can be referred to here as critical
studies, also became enmeshed in the approach they were attacking.
In Pierre Schlag's terms, they have been colonized and domesticated
by the Langdellian paradigm they were trying not only to escape, but
to condemn.'3 In fact, their methodological starting point was essen-
tially the same as that of the public choice scholars. Rather than try-
ing to determine how elites used the law as an instrument for social
control, or drawing upon empirical sources that did so, critical legal
studies scholars assumed, from an examination of the law itself, that
this process was occurring. In other words, their approach was equally
interpretive; they surmised the existence of the elite's control of law
by studying law, not by studying elites. At this point, the critical legal
studies approach diverged from public choice, but not in a direction
that led them to the social movements literature. Public choice schol-
ars began from the assumption that public decision makers were neu-
tral, but self-interested; those decision makers would thus be influ-
enced by the most powerful parties to come through the door.
Critical legal studies assumed that public decision makers were part of
the controlling elite, and were thus irretrievably committed to main-
taining its control. 112 Sometimes these decision makers could conceal
this bias, from themselves as well as others, by relying on the neutrality
of law; since law was itself biased in favor of the elite, however, this
produced the same result. For critical legal studies scholars, then,
there was no one coming through the door at all. The baneful effects
that they perceived were programmed into the decision-making proc-
ess itself.
On the basis of this analysis, critical legal studies scholars might
have adopted the prescriptive stance of opening the door and inviting
the public into the judicial, legislative, or administrative chambers.
They might have explored methods by which social movements could
undermine the elitist bias of the law through litigation or political ac-
tion. A few attempts of this nature were made, most notably Roberto
Unger's discussion of grass roots organizations in False Necessity. 33 For
the most part, however, the prescriptive stance they adopted was to
131 See generally Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi:" The Politics of Form and
the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZo L. REV. 1631 (1990) (analyzing the poli-
tics of deconstruction in legal theory); Schlag, Problem of the Subject, supra note 122
(analzing Langdellian legal theory).
, See supra note 37 (citing sources).
1,33 ROBERTO UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN
THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987).
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keep the door closed, and to appear before the decision maker them-
selves. The argument that they used was not drawn from social sci-
ence, from some analysis of oppression and inequality within society,
but from deconstructive theory.
134 They tried to prove to judicial deci-
sion makers themselves, and to those who shared the discourse of ju-
dicial decision makers, that legal doctrine was not coherent, thus re-
vealing its true nature as an instrumentality of social control. In other
words, they were framing arguments to courts, just as a litigant would.
They were not assuming that the judges were neutral, but were trying
to shame them into neutrality by demonstrating the incoherence of
their reasoning.
The jurocentric quality of this approach is apparent; it lies not
only in the stance of the scholar as a hypothetical litigant before a de-
cision maker, but also in the use of deconstruction as an argument.
This argument can only apply to judicial reasoning; legislators and
administrators never claim that their decisions possess the kind of in-
ternal coherence that would be vulnerable to deconstruction. In-
stead, these legislative and administrative decisions are supposed to
represent good social policy because they follow some pragmatic 'deci-
sion-making protocol, like cost-benefit analysis, or because they repre-
sent the will of the people as refracted through their representatives.
These claims are quite vulnerable to a critical attack, and that attack
has been vigorously pursued by many social scientists. But it is not
vulnerable to deconstruction. The choice of deconstruction as a
methodology thus restricted the critique to the judiciary. This con-
tributed to the insulation of critical legal studies from social move-
ment literature; when real forces of reform appear in critical legal
studies scholarship, as opposed to the hypothesized forces of the
scholars themselves, they appear only as litigants, and thus are conven-
iently viewed from the inside of the courthouse door.
Feminism and critical race theory might have been expected to
escape this abstract and jurocentric approach, since they overlapped
with real social movements in American politics. In fact, the social
science literature on women's movements and civil rights or racial jus-
tice movements is enormous, but the contact between feminist and
critical race legal scholarship and this literature has not been exten-
sive. Despite its greater political realism, feminist and critical race
scholars began by adopting the same stance as critical legal studies.
They directed their arguments to judges, and tried to demonstrate
134 See supra note 40 (citing sources).
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that the judges' reasoning was defective and fraught with, or at least
predicated on, underlying biases. While they made some use of de-
construction, many shifted to the less global critique of demonstrating
that the judges' decisions violated their own principles, that their con-
clusions were in conflict with the legal system's underlying commit-
ment to equality and human rights. This approach gave their efforts a
directionality that critical legal studies lacked, and also promised
greater chances of success, but it located feminist and critical race
theory scholarship even more securely in judicial discourse, and fore-
stalled the development of their connections to social movements
scholarship.
Feminists and critical race theorists, however, did not restrict
themselves to the methodology of critical legal studies; very quickly,
they developed a distinctive methodology of their own-the use of
personal narrative. This was, in effect, a form of testimony; scholars
were using their own experiences as arguments to change judicial atti-
tudes, or to persuade other scholars that such changes were desirable.
It extended beyond the previous limits of legal scholarship, but not
enotigh to alter that scholarship's quasi-litigative character. It was, in
effect, arguing for the admission of another form of evidence into
consideration. The use of narrative moved feminist and critical race
legal scholarship even further from the naturally related social move-
ments literature. Rather than discussing the mobilization of women
and minorities, the growth of organizational structures to represent
these groups, and their efforts to reform the law, legal scholars turned
to their personal and largely individual experiences.
One methodological link between narrative scholarship and Con-
tinental social movement scholarship is that both drew on the Conti-
nental idea that the scholar can only understand her subject matter by
being involved in it. But again, the jurocentric character of the legal
approach maintained a separation between the two bodies of work.
While Melucci and Touraine were engaged in extensive interaction
with actual social movements, legal scholars were recounting their
personal experience of pregnancy, or their mistreatment on the basis
of race. This is not meant to criticize narrative legal scholarship,
which produced some of the most eloquent and original writing in
modern legal literature. The point is simply that narration of this
kind is not likely to link this scholarship with the social science schol-
arship on social movements.
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IV. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CONNECTION
WITH SOCIAL MOVEMENT LITERATURE
A. Descriptive and Prescriptive Legal Scholarship
Given the overlap in both subject matter and methodology be-
tween social movements literature and legal scholarship, the failure by
legal scholars to make contact with this literature represents an oppor-
tunity that has been overlooked. There is much to learn from social
movements literature. Making the effort to do so will not only enrich
the study of law, but may also help it to escape its current methodo-
logical limitations.
Despite the essentially prescriptive character of legal scholarship,
one benefit of making contact with social movement scholarship in-
volves the descriptive enterprise. As a number of observers have
pointed out, if one is going to frame prescriptions to legal decision
makers, it is a good idea to know something about the subject matter
of those prescriptions.135 Unless the subject matter is entirely ab-
stract-which law is certainly not-a prescriptive methodology de-
pends upon persuasive descriptions of the relevant factual situations.
Beginning with the legal realist movement, legal scholarship has un-
dergone a gradual but continuous process of freeing itself from its
formalist origins and of incorporating empirical data about the com-
plex world in which its recommendations are necessarily embedded.
It still reveals, however, the unfortunate tendencies of speaking about
organizations without adducing data about organizational behavior,
and of discussing social policy without offering a theory of society. Its
failure to take account of social movements scholarship is one of sev-
eral of its empirical lacunae, and one whose elimination would cast
See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV.
763, 776 (1986) (stating that policymaking is better when based on an understanding
of the legal system); Frank Munger & Carroll Seron, Critical Legal Studies Versus Critical
Legal Theory: A Comment on Method, 6 LAW & POL'Y, 257, 276-79 (1984) (calling for an
understanding of the relational and contingent nature of group activity to give mean-
ing to legal research); Schlag, Normativity, supra note 120, at 832-35 (theorizing that to
understand that legal thought is a practice and a process is to understand that objecti-
fication is sedimented not only in normative legal thought but in humanity); Peter
Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 334
(1989) (calling for academics to conduct empirical legal research in order to improve
legal models and theories); David Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 581 (1984) (asserting that "factual inquiry in legal
studies is necessary because law cannot be defined other than by the difference it
makes in society"); Tushnet, supra note 120, at 1209 (stating that policy prescription is
based on common sense).
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new light on many legal issues involving both litigation and admini-
stration.
A second and more readily recognized advantage of contact with
social movement literature is that this literature could assist legal
scholars in their prescriptive enterprise. Because of its unity of dis-
course with the judiciary, legal scholars have generally treated the ex-
istence of social movements as irrelevant to their prescriptions. It may
be the case, however, that the existence of these movements would
provide a basis for changing the rules that govern litigation or admini-
stration. Much of law, after all, confers normative significance on
empirical distinctions. It has long recognized the difference between
negligent and willful action, between modal and exceptional behavior,
and between the competent and the incompetent. Contemporary law
makes additional distinctions that were not previously recognized,
such as the difference between merchants and consumers, or between
compliant and disobedient corporations. It may be that social move-
ments could be recognized as a legally significant category, and that
legal rules could be explicitly designed with the role of social move-
ments in mind.
With respect to description, much of our nation's legal history can
be described as the product of social movements, and this perspective
might provide new insights into otherwise familiar events. The
American Revolution, like many revolutions, was a classic social
movement, and the Boston Tea Party stands as a paradigmatic image
of a mobilized, participatory populace. 1:" As early as 1926, J. Franklin
Jameson wrote The American Revolution Considered as a Social Move-
ment, 13 in which he argued that the Revolution was a genuine social
uprising, and had produced important effects on American society.1
s
Some contemporary scholars, such as Jack Greene, see the Revolution
in terms related to the resource mobilization literature, while others,
136 See generally BENJAMIN WOODS LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY (1964) (ex-
plaining the significance of the event in the arrival of the American Revolution).
When the Dartmouth, carrying East India Company tea subject to the Townshend
duty, docked in Boston, thousands of Bostonians gathered in a body, on a daily basis,
to decide how to respond. Samuel Adams acted as moderator of the group. Whether
this resulted from an indigenous effort or the leadership of policy entrepreneurs, it
seems to fit the pattern of demonstrations generated by contemporary social move-
ments.
137J. FRANKLIN JAMESON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL
MOVEMENT (1926).
138 See id. (demonstrating how the Revolution altered the status of persons, their
relationship with the land, industry and commerce, and popular thought and feeling
in American society).
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such as Bernard Bailyn, emphasize identity formation.'" These
themes continue in the literature about the Articles of Confederation
period and the drafting of the Constitution.'
40 In contrast, legal
scholars have tended to regard the Constitution as a purely political
act, a product of the Framers' deliberations during one summer in
Philadelphia, and one subsequent set of pamphlets written by Madi-
son and Hamilton.'
41
It might be illuminating for legal scholars to envision the Consti-
tution as part of a larger social process, the product of a mobilized
citizenry whose members were either attempting to achieve particular
goals or to define their own identity. Those who adopt an originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation might benefit from explor-
ing the goal-seeking and identity-formation efforts of the people who
supported the project of drafting a new constitution and then voted in
favor of the result. Behind the language of the Constitution, and be-
hind the compromises of the delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion, lies a vague but profound set of goals that animated the Ameri-
can people as individuals and as a group. This complex mixture
included rational objectives such as a desire for liberty, for order, for
economic growth, and for preservation of the status quo; it also in-
cluded the desire, among the widely dispersed inhabitants of the sepa-
rate states, to become Americans, members of a unified and powerful
nation. It is these goals, embodied in the social movements of the
time, that might fairly be described as the Constitution's true intent,
not because the intent of the ratifiers counts more than the intent of
the drafters, but because the drafters themselves can be regarded as
policy entrepreneurs of the social movements that stood behind them,
and because the drafters' understanding of their own language would
have been determined by these movements.
In the era following the adoption of the Constitution, the growth
of political parties and the advent of Jacksonian democracy could be
understood in social movement terms,1
42 and such an understanding
' 139 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967) (focusing on the content of the extensive pamphlet literature of
the Revolution); JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER (1963) (presenting the
emergence of the lower houses of assembly in the southern royal colonies as a prelude
to the Revolution).
140 See, e.g., JACKSON TURNER MAIN, POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION
(1973) (adopting the resource mobilization view); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969) (emphasizing identity formation).
141 For a notable exception, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991).
142 See GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS (1952) (describing the
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might provide insight into some of the seminal Supreme Court deci-
sions of the era. 43 Of much greater significance, from the constitu-
tional perspective, was abolitionism, a classic social movement. 44 It
would be difficult to argue that the abolitionists were motivated by
economic interest or any other practical inducement; what impelled
them was moral outrage and religious conviction. Their efforts, which
can be usefully interpreted in terms of both resource mobilization and
identity formation, led first to the gradual elimination of slavery in the
North by statute, 45 and then, following the Civil War, to the Civil War
Amendments and the abortive effort to reform the social structure of
the South. 146 The darker side of social movements is revealed in the
personalities and events that enabled the American political transition from Jefferson-
ian democracy to Jacksonian democracy); DALL W. FORSYrHE, TAXATION AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE YOUNG NATION 1781-1833 (1977) (exploring the social and
political developments underlying the initial period of expansion of the U.S. revenue
system); RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE SECOND AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM: PARTY
FORMATION IN THEJACSONIAN ERA (2d ed. 1973) (examining the social and historical
circumstances leading to the emergence of the two-party system in America); ROBERT
V. REMINI, ANDREWJACKSON (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1998) (tracing Jackson's life
in the context of important national developments); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE AGE OFJACKSON (1945) (providing a sweeping study of the first part of the nine-
teenth century); GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA, 1828-1848 (1959)
(presenting the history of the pre-Civil War period).
143 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (invalidating a New
York statute granting exclusive navigational rights to two individuals on the grounds
that it violates the Commerce Clause); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 313
(1819) (striking down a Maryland law taxing the Bank of the United States as unconsti-
tutionally interfering with Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce). Justice
Marshall's nationalist sympathies can be regarded as a matter of his nationalist predi-
lections, but they can also be regarded as reflections of an emerging national identity.
144 See generally LAWRENCE J. FRIEDMAN, GREGARIOUS SAINTS: SELF AND
COMMUNITY IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM, 1830-1870 (1982) (studying the first genera-
tion of immediatist abolitionists); EDWARD MAGDOL, THE ANTISLAVERY RANK AND FILE:
A SOCIAL PROFILE OF THE ABOLITIONISTS' CONSTITUENCY (1986) (exploring the iden-
tity of the abolitionists); THE ANTISLAVERY VANGUARD (Martin Duberman ed., 1965)
(containing essays on the abolitionist movement); WUJIN-PING, FREDERICK DOUGLASS
AND THE BLACK LIBERATION MOVEMENT (2000) (reevaluating Douglass's place and
role in American history).
145 See generally IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST Two CENTURIES
OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 228-55 (1998) (detailing the slow death of slavery in
the North, in part through emancipation legislation by Northern lawmakers); LEON F.
LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961) (examining the position of African Americans in
the antebellum North). This was not a minor matter, either conceptually or pragmati-
cally. Conceptually, Vermont and Pennsylvania were the first two jurisdictions in the
world to abolish slavery. Pragmatically, there were some 40,000 slaves in the North at
the time the Constitution went into effect.
146 See generally GEORGE R. BENTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU
(1955) (presenting an account of the efforts and motivations of the abolitionist
group); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
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Ku Klux Klan and the Redeemer movements that frustrated these re-
form efforts, and reestablished a modified form of the South's
antebellum social structure.
147 Their impact on the American legal
system did not dissipate until well after the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964;148 perhaps it has not dissipated yet.
The next major era in American history is defined by the social
movements of Populism
149 and Progressivism"O. The Supreme Court's
effort to quash Progressive legislation
1 51 can be understood as part of
1877 (1988) (reconsidering the social, political, and economic developments 
of the
era following the Civil War); LEON LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: 
THE
AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY (1980) (presenting an oral history of the experiences 
of newly
freed slaves in the South after the Civil War).
147 See generally EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER
RECONSTRUCTION (1992) (examining society, politics, and the economy in 
the New
South); FONER, supra note 146, at 564-601 (describing the backlash against reconstruc-
tionist efforts during the period surrounding the 1876 presidential election); 
MICHAEL
PERMAN, THE ROAD TO REDEMPTION: SOUTHERN POLITICS, 1869-1879, at 
135-277
(1984) (covering the politics of divergence during the Redemption era); GEORGE 
C.
RABLE, BUr THERE WAS No PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS 
OF
RECONSTRUCTION (1984) (examining the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, among 
other
groups, during the postbellum period); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: 
THE Ku
KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971) (tracing 
the devel-
opment of the Klan from 1866 to 1872); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF 
THE NEW
SOUTH, 1877-1913, at 1-106 (1951) (analyzing the period immediately following 
Re-
construction in the South).
148 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
149 See generally LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT, at vii (1978) (writ-
ing about "the largest democratic mass movement in American history"); 
JOHN D.
HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT (1961) (examining the roles of the Farmers' 
Alliance
and the People's Party in the Populist movement); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, 
THE AGE OF
REFORM 23-130 (1955) (exploring the myths, folklore, and realities underlying 
.the
Populist movement). Populism has left an imprint on the financial services 
industry.
Apart from that, its influence is unclear; in all likelihood, its political failure 
meant
that it would have less impact than more successful social movements such as 
Progres-
sivism, abolition, and Redemption.
150 Cf GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963) (arguing that the
social movement of Progressivism failed, and that the legislation of the era 
was pro-
duced and enacted by propertied elites). See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE
TO INDUSTRIALISM: 1885-1914 (1957) (studying the human responses, including 
Pro-
gressivism, to economic and social developments in the period between the end 
of Re-
construction and the outbreak of World War I); HOFSTADTER, supra note 149, at 
131-
271 (analyzing Progressivism as a national, urban, and middle-class phenomenon);
THE GILDED AGE (H. Wayne Morgan ed., rev. ed. 1970) (printing papers presented 
at
a symposium on the post-Civil War generation); THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Lewis 
L. Gould
ed., 1974) (containing essays on the achievements of this reform period).
151 See, e.g., Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum-hours
legislation); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating legislation that prohib-
ited contractual promises not to unionize); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 
U.S. 525
(1923) (invalidating minimum wage legislation); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 
350
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the conflict between an enormous social movement and the forces
that attempted to resist it. The defeat of this resistance in the Court,52
after a long battle that lasted until well into the New Deal era, has es-
sentially defined contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. Legal
scholars have tended to treat the Court's role in protecting human
rights as primary, and tried to explain why this is a more valid inter-
vention than the substantive due process cases that attempted to pro-
tect private property against Progressive legislation. 15 3 From a social
movement perspective, however, the main story, in constitutional
terms, may be the validation of Progressive legislation; the Court's
human rights decisions, with their emphasis on disadvantaged minori-
ties, could be viewed as a subsidiary theme that follows from the cen-
tral act of siding with Progressivism.
A considerably more important effect of Progressivism upon
American law was the creation of regulatory agencies, the enactment
of social reform legislation, and the consequent advent of an adminis-
trative state. Treating the administrative state as the product of a
powerful social movement, rather than a bleak necessity that was
forced upon an unwilling populace, leads to the reinterpretation of
many aspects of our law, and perhaps of our concept of law in gen-
(1928) (invalidating regulation of employment agency fees); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating restrictions on entry into business).
152 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Ad-
kins); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Lochner, effectively); Ol-
sen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (overruling Ribnik); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (overruling Coppage); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (overruling New State Ice and condemning Lochner).See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 70-128 (1980) (assessing the substantive scope of individual rights and ap-
praising the Court's record in protecting those rights); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980) (proposing a theory of judicial review that takes into account
society's substantive value choices while respecting the underlying democratic assump-
tions of the American political system); Fiss, supra note 112 (discussing adjudication as
structural reform and the theory of legislative failure). This is, of course, the theme of
the famous "Footnote 4" in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713, 718 (1985)
(arguing for a reorientation of Carolene's operative terms as "America moves toward the
participatory paradigm");J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275 (1989) (dis-
cussing "the opinion as footnote" and the "footnote as opinion" through a discussion
of the Carolene context); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside-
Outsider", 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1986) (contending that Carolene is not adequately
protective of the rights of insular and discrete minorities and that it effectuates an"unarticulated ideal of democratic theory" that is at odds with the Constitution). But
see Geoffrey Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397 (con-
tending that the statute at issue was irrational, special interest legislation).
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eral. 54 Treating the statutes that Progressivism produced in this man-
ner supports the argument recently advanced by William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn that many of these were "super-statutes" that courts
have treated, and should treat, as quasi-constitutional.
5 5 Subsidiary
strands within the Progressive movement might provide similar in-
sights into our legal system. The fact that our labor laws are the prod-
uct of a social movement might suggest a different approach to their
interpretation and administration; similarly, the social movement ori-
gins of women's suffrage might have relevance for contemporary
feminism.
This brings us to the modern era, and to the social movements
that inspired the contemporary social science literature and that have
already been discussed above. If an understanding of the American
Revolution and the Constitution's creation and ratification in social
movement terms can inform an originalist interpretation of the Con-
stitution, then an understanding of all these subsequent social move-
ments can inform an evolving interpretation. These movements not
only shed light on what our Constitution, when viewed as an evolving
document, means, but also what it means to have a constitution. Abo-
litionism, progressivism, the civil rights movement, environmentalism,
and consumerism have altered people's conception about the proper
role of government, and about the content of due process and equal
protection. By enlisting government as a resource for broad-ranging
social and economic goals, these movements have transformed that
government; by developing a new conception of citizenship and
American identity, they have transformed our conception of liberty
and fairness. In their interaction with constitutional provisions over
the course of our history, these movements have reinterpreted the
Constitution itself from a document that creates an effective but de-
limited government to a body of doctrine that represents our evolving
conception of ourselves as a moral community.
With respect to the prescriptive aspects of legal scholarship, social
movement literature can be used in a more detailed, pragmatic way to
generate ideas for the field's quotidian task-framing recommenda-
tions for the reform of existing statutory and doctrinal rules. One
area where contact with the social movements scholarship might offer
14 I argue to this effect in a forthcoming work, Edward L. Rubin, Onward Past Ar-
thur: Rethinking Politics and Law for the Administrative State (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
p55 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE LJ. 1215
(2001).
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such prescriptive insights is the doctrine of standing. The Supreme
Court's rulings in this area are not only incoherent, but, worse still,
insincere." ' The elaborate recitations of personal interest required of
the plaintiffs in environmental cases such as Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life bespeak a feigned obliviousness to the real world, since such suits
can only be maintained by the Defenders of Wildlife and similar or-
ganizations.17  On the other hand, it continues to be undesirable to
have one person litigate an issue that is of greater concern to another.
The matter has been ably analyzed by several scholars, including Wil-
liam Fletcher and Cass Sunstein,F8 but would probably benefit from a
better understanding of the social movements that spawn public in-
156 For the most notorious cases, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992), appearing in discussion below; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984), hold-
ing that parents of African-American children have no standing to challenge an IRS
ruling that improperly grants tax-exempt status to segregated academies designed to
exclude them; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 28
(1976), holding that welfare recipients have no standing to challenge an IRS ruling
that improperly grants tax-exempt status to hospitals that refuse to serve them; Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975), holding that inner-city residents who want to move to
low-cost housing in a particular suburb, residents of a neighboring suburb that absorbs
a disproportionate amount of low-cost housing, builders who want to build low-cost
housing in that suburb, and a non-profit organization concerned about this issue all
lack standing to challenge the suburb's restrictive zoning practices that preclude the
construction of low-cost housing; and United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180
(1974), holding that a taxpayer has no standing to enforce a constitutional provision
that requires all federal agencies to publish their budget for scrutiny by taxpayers.
There are cases going in the opposite direction, which simply demonstrates that the
Supreme Court's doctrine is incoherent. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 211-12 (1995) (concluding that Adarand has standing to challenge the
federal government's practice of giving general contractors on government projects a
financial incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by "socially and economically dis-
advantaged individuals"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277-78
(1978) (allowing a white medical school applicant to challenge the school's admissions
program as violative of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 675-76 (1973) (allowing environmental groups, including Students Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) and the Environmental Defense Fund, to
challenge a U.S. regulatory scheme allowing railroads to impose higher rates).
1.5 See 504 U.S. at 555 (holding that Congress may not confer jurisdiction on citi-
zens to bring environmental enforcement actions unless those citizens would have
standing under the Court's idiosyncratic interpretation of Article III); see also Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (holding that citizens who would
have standing under Lujan still do not have standing if the Court cannot redress their
injury).
158 See William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 243-47 (1988)
(examining "the apparent lawlessness of so-called third party standing"); Cass Sun-
stein, What's Standing After Lujan: Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article II, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163, 220-36 (1992) (discussing the effectiveness of the citizen suit).
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terest litigation. Information on the way that social movements 
use
litigation as a resource, or as a means of creating a collective identity,
would shed light on the nature of this litigation, and on the role of 
so-
cial movements in it. This might lead, in turn, to recommendations
for recognizing organizations as valid plaintiffs in actions that 
are
relevant to their concerns.159
Another litigation-related issue where legal scholarship would
benefit from an understanding of social movements is the certification
of class actions and the payment of attorney's fees.'" To begin 
with, it
would aid our understanding of class actions to know how 
social
movements use them as resources for legal reform, and to what 
extent
they depend upon the various forms of attorney's fee arrangements
for this instrumentality to be viable."" This descriptive information
159 Of the cases cited supra note 156, all should be reversed because at least one
institutional plaintiff was a valid representative of a readily 
recognized social move-
ment that was perfectly capable of representing the asserted 
position; in most cases,
only such a representative can represent the position. The 
basic case that would be
overruled according to this consideration is Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
This was not an unexpected or incoherent decision; the 
Sierra Club was trying to
change the law and obtain recognition as an institutional litigant, 
and the Court re-
fused to change the law. But a sensitivity to the real world, 
and the role of social
movements in that world, suggests that the case was wrongly 
decided.
160 For discussions of the representational issues in class actions, see John Coffee,
Class Wars: The Dilemmas of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1343 (1995);
John Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on 
Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625
(1987); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's 
Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); and David 
Rosenberg, Class Ac-
tions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective 
Means, 62 IND. LJ. 561 (1987).
For discussions of attorney's fees, see Mauro Capalletti & Bryant 
Garth, Access to Justice:
The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Legal Rights 
Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REV.
181 (1978); Kathryn Christie, Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 347
(1984); and Harold Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy: Panacea 
or Placebo, 71 C-I.-KENT L.
REV. 415 (1995).
161 Macey and Miller condemn current class action rules for their "inappropriate
attempt to treat entrepreneurial litigation as if it were essentially 
the same as standard
litigation in which the client exercises substantial influence." 
Macey & Miller, supra
note 160, at 3. One such rule is the requirement that the suit 
be brought on behalf of
a named plaintiff, see id. at 61-96 (discussing the regulations 
governing the representa-
tive plaintiffs or persons who are allowed to be named in 
class and derivative litiga-
tion). Macey and Miller's recommendation that actions should 
be brought on behalf
of the class itself parallels the suggestion that organizations should 
be granted standing
without having to assert standing on the basis of a named individual. 
See Sierra Club,
405 U.S. at 740 (rejecting a suit brought by an organizational 
litigant, in its own name,
on standing grounds); see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, 
EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS:
THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM 7-10 (1987) (arguing that 
organizations should be
granted standing). More generally, the same observations that 
lead Macey and Miller
to suggest an auction in class actions where money damages 
are available also suggest
that organizations that represent a social movement be allowed 
to represent a class in
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naturally leads to normative conclusions. Some legal problems can
only be addressed through private law if they are the subject of class
actions, and if prevailing plaintiffs' lawyers can be paid fees by the de-
fendant; in other cases, however, class actions and attorney's fees are
vehicles for personal gain and legal abuse. Taking account of the re-
lationship between class actions and social movements may enable us
to distinguish between these situations, and to alter our rules regard-
ing class certification and attorney's fees to achieve particular social
policy objectives. For example, social movements that engaged or
transformed the identity of their members are more likely to use class
action litigation as a means of law reform, and might be subject to
more permissive class action rules.
More generally, many statutes or regulations that are enforced by
privately initiated law suits may depend on the existence of a social
movement for their effectiveness. Creating a cause of action to litigate
complex environmental or consumer protection issues may be an
empty gesture unless there is a social movement to initiate and sup-
port such litigation. On the basis of the social movements literature,
scholars might be able to frame prescriptions about the kinds of social
movements that can play this role, or the kinds of private law suits that
must be authorized in order to enlist the efforts of these social move-
ments. The relevant considerations may go well beyond the typical
one of whether to grant attorney's fees. For example, a cause of ac-
tion that allows for incremental but dramatic legal issues may aid a so-
cial movement's recruitment and mobilization efforts, thereby provid-
ing it with far more resources than attorney's fees could possibly
provide.
In the administrative area, understanding the role of social
movements might be even more useful for prescriptive purposes. Le-
gal scholarship has already incorporated an analysis of interest groups
into its discussion of legislative and agency decision making. As stated
above, however, it tends to treat every lobbyist who comes through the
door as the representative of an economic special interest. Additional
descriptive accuracy might be obtained by distinguishing between
special interests and social movements, between the relatively small,
self-interested groups that are generated by the economic sphere, and
the larger, ideological ones that the social sphere or civil society pro-
duces. This might enable legal scholars to frame prescriptions regard-
ing the administrative procedures that are currently employed to gen-
cases where injunctive relief is sought.
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erate new regulations, or to obtain compliance with those already
made. The principal procedure for formulating agency regulations is
notice and comment rulemaking,"
2 which provides that the agency
must solicit comments from the general public on a proposed regula-
tion. Comments are often received from both special economic in-
terests and from social movements; an understanding of the latter
might provide some basis for recommendations that these comments
be assessed in different ways. Negotiated rulemaking is even more
explicit in its recognition of interest group politics.
1" Rather than
leaving formulation of the proposed regulation to agency staff, it es-
tablishes a procedure whereby representatives of conflicting interest
groups meet together and attempt to reach consensus on the pro-
posal. Here again, the social movement literature may suggest ways of
identifying different negotiating parties, or alternate means of struc-
turing the negotiations. 64 For example, the extent to which negoti-
162 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (providing the details of this procedure). See generally
CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND
MAKE POLICY (2d ed. 1999) (describing the procedure and significance of agency
rulemaking, and acknowledging one scholar's assertion that notice and comment
rulemaking is one of the greatest inventions of modern government); Colin S. Diver,
Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981) (arguing that
the model of policymnaking employed by agencies has shifted from a decentralized,
gradual, and narrowly focused approach to a more structural, static, and expansive ap-
proach, clarifying the relationship between public participation and the substantive
choices agencies must make); Peter Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The Role of the President and
OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986) (addressing the role of
presidential supervision in the informal rulemaking process as shaping agency policy
as opposed to usurping agency authority).
3 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994) (establishing a framework for the conduct of
negotiated rulemaking in part to facilitate communication between parties with differ-
ent interests). See generally Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Per-
formance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (analyzing the use of regu-
latory negotiation by federal agencies over a thirteen-year period and evaluating its
ability to save time and avoid legal challenges to promulgated rules); Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (arguing
for a collaborative administrative rulemaking process as forwarding the goals of effi-
ciency and legitimacy, which are viewed as lacking); Philip Harter, Negotiating Regula-
tions: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) (advocating for a form of negotiation
among interested parties to alleviate wastes in time and expense and dissatisfaction
with other forms of agency rulemaking); Jeffrey Lubbers, Better Regulations: The Na-
tional Performance Review's Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 DUKE L.J. 1165 (1994)
(offering negotiated rulemaking as a positive alternative to notice-and-comment rule-
making, which encourages adversarial behavior); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rule-
making in Practice, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 482 (1986) (proposing negotiated
rulemaking as a realistic alternative to adversarial administrative procedures).
164 Negotiated rulemaking has been criticized as ineffective. See Coglianese, supra
note 163, at 1261 ("Despite all the postulations about how negotiated rulemaking will
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ated rulemaking procedures are employed, or the amount of cre-
dence that negotiated rules are given in subsequent judicial review,
may depend on the presence of a social movement that can reliably
reflect diffuse concerns. On this criterion, negotiated rules in the en-
vironmental area would rank high, those in the consumer area would
be in the middle, and those involving welfare would rank low. The
Negotiated Rulemaking Act suggests that we have overcome our pre-
vious reluctance to acknowledge the role of lobbyists in the adminis-
trative process, and instead have adopted a more realistic approach.
Social movement literature suggests that we need to overcome our
remaining reluctance to distinguish among lobbyists on the basis that
some are part of the economic system, while others represent social
movements generated within civil society. This literature may also
lead to more general prescriptions for the reform of rulemaking pro-
cedures. In place of the episodic contacts that exist under current
procedures, it might suggest some sort of continuing, consultative re-
lationship with representatives of broad-based movements.
save time and eliminate litigation, the procedure so far has not proven itself superior
to the informal rulemaking that agencies ordinarily use."); William Funk, Wen Smoke
Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA 's Woodstove Standards,
18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking subverts the principles
and values of administrative rulemaking by altering an agency's objective from serving
the public interest to searching for a consensus among private parties); Jim Rossi, Par-
ticipation Run Amok, Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997) (arguing that public participation in
agency decisions can have adverse effects); Seidenfeld, supra note 113, at 413 (arguing
that collaborative regulation is incapable of resolving current regulatory ills because"they can succeed in overcoming the adversarial propensities of at least some
stakeholders only within narrow regulatory environments"). Perhaps negotiation, in
the structured manner prescribed by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, is not the best
way to involve citizens in general, or social movements in particular, in the rulemaking
process. The idea, however, seems too promising to abandon without further explora-
tion of its possibilities. The point here is that analysis of this, and other techniques for
rulemaking, should be carried out with an understanding of social movements. Sei-
denfeld is certainly alert to this issue, and analyzes negotiated rulemaking with explicit
reference to what he calls public interest groups. Rather than relying on social move-
ment literature to describe these groups, however, he relies largely on the literature
regarding interest groups. E.g., INTEREST GROUP POLITICS (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett
A. Loomis eds., 2d ed. 1986) (exploring the study of interest group politics); TERRY
MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF
POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS (1980) (analyzing interest groups from the perspective of
the individuals' decision to join, organizational formation and maintenance, and in-
ternal politics). This is a perfectly valid approach, but it restricts the analysis to the
present scope of legal scholarship. See Seidenfeld, supra note 108, at 429 ("Literature
on public interest groups has characterized the traditional interest group-the pure
membership group-as the archetype of public interest groups."). Attention to the
social movements literature, and the new perspective that would result, suggests that
the condemnation of negotiated rulemaking has been premature.
[Vol. 150: 1
76 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
any social movement.6 9 By drawing on social movements literature,
legal scholars might be able to frame recommendations for the design
of statutes that will enlist social movements as part of their enforce-
ment mechanism.
Beyond this, statutes and regulations sometimes have the effect of
creating or amplifying social movements that can then play a role in
the enforcement process. A statute may constitute a crucial resource
for a nascent social movement, or may provide an opportunity for
identity formation by a group of potential participants. This process
needs to be understood in greater depth. Scholars might recommend
to policyrnakers that they consciously try to create or encourage social
movements in order to achieve particular types of enforcement; they
might suggest that the effect on potential or actual social movements
should be one of the issues that policymakers take into account. To
be sure, there may be something disturbing about enlisting or un-
leashing social movements in support of a government initiative. But
since this will occur whether it is planned or not, there is a strong ar-
gument for at least devoting some thought to the issue. The possibil-
ity of doing so, for legal scholars, depends on their ability to assimilate
the social science research on social movements.
B. The Social Construction of Law
The distinction between description and prescription is a useful
one, and is commonly invoked in legal scholarship. Because this Arti-
cle is a discussion of the overlap between legal scholarship and social
science, however, it is also useful to consider the contemporary social
science position on the underlying issue. Most social scientists no
longer accept the distinction between description and prescription, or
169 The impetus for enactment of OSHA did not come from organized labor, but
from officials in the Department of Labor. While the AFL-CIO ultimately supported
the legislation, as did various public interest organizations, none undertook the task of
enforcing OSHA the way ACORN undertook the enforcement of the CRA. SeeJOHN
MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETYAND HEALTH POLICY 16 (1979) ("Since the failings of collective
bargaining derived mainly from members' disinclination to give up much in return for
greater safety, one might wonder whether [OSHA] reflected the preferences of union
members or only of their leaders."); Steven Kelman, Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 236 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) ("Labor
criticized OSHA for not making rules fast enough and not being serious enough about
enforcement.");Judson MacLaury, TheJob Safety Law of 1970: Its Passage Was Perilous,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1981, at 18 (explaining that the Department of Labor pro-
vided a model for ajob safety and health program with PresidentJohnson's backing).
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The enforcement of statutes and regulations by administrative
agencies raises other possibilities for prescriptive legal scholarship
based on the social movements literature. Just as legal initiatives that
are enforced by private lawsuits may depend on social movements for
their effectiveness, other initiatives may depend on such movements
for compliance with publicly initiated enforcement efforts."' The
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA),166 for example, lacked a legal
enforcement mechanism, but turned out to be quite effective because
groups concerned with community development in inner city areas
were able to make an issue, in regulatory proceedings, of banks' com-
pliance with the Act's provisions.'67 The Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA)," s which includes enforcement mechanisms, may
be less effective than it could be because of its failure to connect with
165 On the issue of enforcement and compliance generally, see IAN AYRES &JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE
(1992); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); ENFORCING REGULATION (Keith Hawkins &
John Thomas eds., 1982); Freeman, supra note 163; Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Robert A. Kagan, Regulatory Enforce-
ment, in HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 383 (David H. Rosen-
bloom & Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994); John Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforce-
ment and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115 (1991); and
John Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Policy, 6 LAW & POL'Y REV. 385 (1984).
166 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). For discussions of this Act, see
Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but
Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293 (1993); Michael
Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market Oriented Alternative to the
Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561 (1995) ;Jonathan K. Macey & Geof-
frey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291
(1993); Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment
Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349 (1993); and Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community
Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive
Racialjustice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (1994).
See DELGADO, supra note 16 ("[C]ommunity organizations were formed to ad-
dress concerns specifically related to the delivery of services by the government and to
the impact of housing, transportation, and education on the spatial and social struc-
ture of the city."); Fishbein, supra note 166, at 297 ("IT]he [CRA] has provided com-
munity groups with substantial leverage to end disinvestment practices and to obtain
commitments from lenders to undertake new community reinvestment initiatives.");
Macey & Miller, supra note 166 (stating that among the principal effects of the CRA is
the enhancement of activist group power in promoting community development with
agencies and encouraging meetings between institutions and groups mounting a CRA
challenge to resolve the differences). Macey and Miller do not regard the CRA as effi-
cient, but they do treat it as producing an impact; if it did not do so, that is, if it were
purely nominal or symbolic legislation with no practical effect, it would not be ineffi-
cient.
168 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2001]
PASSING THROUGH THE DOOR
to put the matter in Hume's terms, between is and ought. The alter-
native that they employ is generally known as the social construction
of reality, and is ultimately based on Husserl's phenomenology. 70 In
essence, it argues that perception itself, and certainly all more abstract
understanding, is the product of interpretation, of a culturally-specific
set of commitments and procedures that give meaning to everything
that we experience."' There is thus no such thing as pure description,
no unmediated access to the world around us, but rather an interpre-
tive process that is imbued with our cultural values and predilections.
Within this interpretive space, it may make sense for us to distinguish
between efforts to describe the world and efforts to pass explicit
judgments on it, but such a distinction can be regarded only as a cul-
turally specific mode of discourse, and not as a defensible epistemo-
logical position."'
This theory of knowledge is directly relevant to law; whatever one
thinks about natural science or mathematics, law is recognized, even
170 See supra note 99 (citing sources).
|71 See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF REALITY 1 (Anchor Books 1967) (1966) ("The basic contentions of the argument of
this book are... namely, that reality is socially constructed. ... ); RICHARD J.
BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTMSM AND RELATIVISM (1983) (arguing that the contrary
notions of human rationality, objectivism, and relativism are converging to form a new
understanding); NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978) (exploring the
idea of rightness when understanding is relative, based on one's frame of reference);
METATHEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: PLURALISMS AND SUBJECTIVITIES (Donald W. Fiske &
Richard A. Shweder eds., 1986) (presenting several views concerning science and sub-
jectivity-objectivity that respond to the rise in contemporary doubt about the possibility
of "standards, canon, or methods definitive of scientific or rational thinking"); ALFRED
SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (George Walsh & Frederick
Lehnert trans., 1967) (analyzing the phenomenon of meaning in ordinary social life to
arrive at an objective context that can be used by social science); PETER WINCH, THE
IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE (1958) (arguing that progress in social sciences need not
come from emulating natural sciences but shares a valuable connection with philoso-
phy concerned with the nature of reality in general).
172 See STANLEY FISH, Is There a Text in This Class?, in CAMPUS WARS: MULTI-
CULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 49 (John Arthur & Amy Shapiro eds.,
1995) ("[M]eaning comes already calculated, not because of norms embedded in the
language but because language is always perceived, from the very first, within a struc-
ture of norms ... not abstract and independent but social."); J.M. Balkin, Ideological
Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 871 (1993) ("[L]egal ideas
and symbols will change their political valence as they are used over and over again in
new contexts."); J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Cultural Software, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221,
1221 (1995) ("[I]ndividuals are afflicted with beliefs that in some way mystify or ob-
scure social reality."); Steven L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 967 (1991) (arguing that all forms of normative behavior "must
be understood in terms of the cognitive processes of internalization and imagina-
tion").
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within the Anglo-American tradition, as a human construct. The
natural law belief that legal rules have some transcultural or even
transcendent content, that they lie beyond the reach of social evolu-
tion, is now generally rejected.1 73 But there remains in American legal
scholarship a certain tendency to treat basic concepts ahistorically, to
view them as conceptually available at any given time, or, more cir-
cumspectly, at any given time in the two centuries of our own constitu-
tional experience. The incorporation of social movements literature
into law might facilitate a recognition of the social science approach
to law, and of legal concepts as socially constructed-the product of
an ongoing, historical process. Having done so, this literature might
then suggest the particular historical processes that have generated
many of our legal concepts. As noted above, social movements are
one of the great motive forces of American law. The implication of
legal scholarship that legal concepts exist in some sort of trans-
historical storehouse, to be drawn out as the moral consensus of soci-
ety and the exigencies of the time demand, distorts the actual process
by which law develops. Not incidentally, it also devalues the effort and
imagination of those who participate in social movements.
The topic is too large to be fully canvassed here. One example,
suggested by the papers in this Symposium, is the concept of rights.
Legal scholarship tends to treat rights as a universally available con-
cept, and to analyze the actual availability of rights according to the
descriptive-prescriptive dichotomy.7 4 From this perspective, virtually
173 Natural law continues to have a certain number of adherents. See, e.g., JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) (describing natural law doctrine
and responding to objections to natural law as a theory); ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN
DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw (1999) (addressing criticisms of natural law theory and ap-
plying natural law to modern issues); LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE
(1987) (arguing that justice is beyond the range of positive law); Michael S. Moore,
Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 2424 (1992) (examining the idea that there are
objective moral truths). For most people, however, the attack on this concept that has
been maintained throughout the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has
proven persuasive. In the United States, legal realism may be understood, in part, as
an attack on the remnants of natural law thinking. The main target of the realists was
what we now call formalism, but Anthony Sebok cautions against treating the formalists
as natural lawyers. See Sebok, supra note 85, at 2057 ("American formalism may have
been guilty of many sins, but natural law is not one of them."). The realists' desire to
brand their enemies as natural lawyers is, however, certainly indicative of the general
rejection of natural law.
174 See, e.g.,JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (1973) (discussing both social ide-
als and normative principles); ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS (1996) (dif-
ferentiating between positive and negative rights while arguing for the necessity of cer-
tain positive rights);JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 195-257 (1971) (describing the
theory of justice and stating what the ends of justice should be); JOSEPH RAz, THE
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everyone would agree that women should have been granted equal
rights during the nineteenth century, as a normative matter, and that
they were not granted these rights, as a descriptive matter. But what
exactly does it mean to say that women should have had rights that
they did not, or that they had rights that were not granted? Where
were those rights, and how would people at the time have conceived
them?
Social movements literature suggests a different way of looking at
the situation. According to this view, the concept of women's rights,
in the contemporary sense, did not exist in the early years of the
American republic. It was created by a complex historical process in
which social movements played a major role. The groups that were
mobilized to fight for the legal status of women-for married women's
property rights and women's suffrage in the nineteenth century, or
for equality of opportunity and anti-rape, anti-abuse, and pornogra-
phy laws in the twentieth-were doing much more than advocating
law reform; they were contributing to the creation of the legal con-
cepts that made such reform possible. The same may be said for the
labor movement, the civil rights movement, the gay rights movement,
and the children's rights movement.
It may be argued that all of these efforts were made possible by
the underlying concept of a right, more specifically a human right.
To the extent that this is true, however, it does not necessarily alter
the conclusion that the concept is the product of social movements,
but only refers us to some earlier period in history when the concept
of human rights in general, rather than these rights in particular, took
form. The contemporary view is that the idea of human rights is a lin-
eal descendent of natural rights, and that the concept of the natural
rights of man-and when natural rights theorists said "man," they
meant only men-was a product of the fourteenth-century debate
over apostolic poverty. This debate pitted the Franciscan order
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 163-263 (1986) (arguing that certain rights should be given a
preferred position in society); SAMUEL STOLJAR, AN ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS (1984) (inves-
tigating when a person should be able to claim a natural right regardless of actual
laws); Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron
ed., 1984) (examining the rights of moral and political independence).
175 See ARTHUR STEPHEN McGRADE, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM OF
OCKHAM: PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 173-96 (1974) (discussing Ock-
ham's conception of natural rights, including the right to be poor); RICHARD TUCK,
NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 17-31 (1979) (analyz-
ing the conflict between Franciscan theory and the theory of Aquinas concerning the
life of apostolic poverty); Jean Dunbabin, Government, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT 477, 511 (J.H. Burns ed., 1988) ("[T]he natural right
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against the Avignon Popes, particularly Pope John XXII, and it was
the Franciscans who developed the idea of natural rights in an effort
to escape papal condemnation. The Franciscans were an archetypal
social movement, mobilized by a charismatic leader to rebuild a
church and then to bring an emotive version of Christianity to the
common people."3 Their history reveals both the mobilization of re-
sources and the transformation of personal identity into a collective
effort characteristic of social movements.
Even if the primordial idea of human rights did not originate
from a social movement-and this will obviously be the case for some
ideas-it would not necessarily argue against the centrality of social
movements in the subsequent development of particular rights. Just
as the concept of human rights is not a transcendent truth, but a so-
cially constructed and socially contingent concept, the relationship
between this idea and its elaborations is constructed and contingent.
1 7
The connections that we now see as natural or implicit were highly
contested at the time, and the concepts that now seem so capacious
were jealously guarded against efforts to extend them. To us, it may
seem astonishing that the Framers could declare human equality
while owning slaves, or that the abolitionists could fight to free the
slaves and yet keep their wives and daughters subjugated in their
homes. Future generations-near future generations, it is to be
hoped-will be equally astonished that current legal authorities refuse
to property was articulated by John Paris and then by Ockham's opponents in the
course of the poverty conflict.").
176 See generally CAJETAN ESSER, ORIGINS OF THE FRANCISCAN ORDER (Aedan Daly &
Irina Lynch trans., 1970) (tracing the early history of the Franciscan Order); JULIEN
GREEN, GOD'S FOOL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FRANCIS OF AssisI (Peter Heinegg trans.,
1985) (examining the leadership of St. Francis of Assisi);JOHN MOORMAN, A HISTORY
OF THE FRANCISCAN ORDER: FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE YEAR 1517 (1968) (recounting
the history of the Franciscan Order).
177 This is not the same as Kelsenian positivism. Kelsen argued that law possessed
no inherent morality, but was merely the command of a sovereign power. See HANS
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 3-49 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945)
(presenting the theory that law is a coercive order); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF
LAW 1-69 (Max Knight trans., 1967) [hereinafter KELSEN, PURE THEORY] (outlining a
positive theory of law); see also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Mor-
als, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605 (1958) ("The effort to show that laws conferring rights
are 'really' only conditional stipulations of sanctions to be exacted from the person
ultimately under a legal duty characterizes much of Kelsen's work."). Kelsen's concern
is with the definition of law, not the definition of rights. He has no objection to the
concept of rights, or even of natural rights; his only point is that this concept is part of
private morality, and cannot be regarded as law unless enacted and enforced by the
sovereign. See KELSEN, PURE THEORY, supra, at 59-69 (describing the relationship be-
tween law and morals).
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to treat a person's choice of sexual partner as an aspect of autonomy.
In fact, it may be the case that there is really no core concept of hu-
man rights at all, despite the antiquity of its antecedents."" Perhaps
that concept is nothing more than the aggregation, the sum total, of
the individual human rights that social movements have fought for so
assiduously during the past two hundred years.
Thus, social movements literature offers a distinctive way of un-
derstanding legal concepts, and of placing them within a larger epis-
temological framework. The idea that these concepts are socially con-
structed is certainly not unknown to law, but social movements
literature offers a powerful argument in favor of that still under-
emphasized idea, an argument of a different character from the exist-
ing ones. Of course, the project is not without its dangers and nega-
tive associations. Underlying this historical approach to legal con-
cepts is a recognition of law's inevitably political character. The
principal components of our legal system are not, according to this
view, the products of reasoning or of neutral judgment by public deci-
sion makers, but hard-fought concessions won by battles in the lobbies
and the streets. Thus, the elements of social movements literature
that are incorporated into legal scholarship seem ultimately to align
with those aspects of legal scholarship with which they share method-
ologies, that is, public choice and critical studies. But the enterprise
escapes the cynicism of public choice and the infuriated condemna-
tion of critical studies by virtue of its grounding in more general social
science. What is absent from the social movements literature is the
belief that law ought to be the product of reasoning or neutral judg-
ment. Rather, the law is, and can only be, according to this approach,
constructed as an evolving historical consciousness in which politics
178 Some political philosophers argue that theories of rights cannot be developed
abstractly, but depend on existing political practices. See RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF RIGHTS 219 (1976) ("[R]ights are a social phenomenon .... [that] can-
not be fully appreciated or evaluated apart from the ways in which the practice [of
rights] fits into and contributes to the mix of rules, values, purposes, and institutions
that constitute this or that society."); REX MARTIN, A SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 97 (1993)
("[T]he crucial issue [for theory of rights] is whether appropriate practices of social
recognition and promotion are in place for that kind of right."); IAN SHAPIRO, THE
EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 304 (1986) (noting that a valid moral the-
ory of rights can only be developed if we "come off the terrain of 'ideal theory' and get
involved in factual arguments about the causal structure of the social world which is
where problems of social justice arise"). Such views are certainly congenial with the
idea of rights as socially constructed, but they are not quite the same thing; they still
allow the concept of rights to exist independent of history. The idea is that one fea-
ture of this abstract, ahistorical concept of rights is that the actual content of the gen-
eral concept depends on existing political practices.
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plays a major role. Thus, law is free of that unexplained, pre-
empirical cynicism that comes from frustrated expectations. Accord-
ing to the social movements literature, law finds its dignity in the ideo-
logical commitment and moral courage of the people whose efforts
have generated so many of its doctrines. The politics that constitute it
are not only the special-interest-group politics of public choice schol-
arship or the elitist oppression of critical studies-although both ele-
ments are undeniably present-but also the genuine idealism of the
many nameless and otherwise powerless individuals who have joined
together to fight for a new position in society, and to confer new posi-
tions on others.
This is not meant to suggest that social movements literature is
free of unexplained, pre-empirical cynicism. Its particular brand of
this affliction stems from its somewhat reductionist view of public de-
cision makers. While it has developed a wonderfully complex and
modulated picture of social movements, it does not always combine
this with an equally sophisticated analysis of government. One of the
leading accounts of government's reaction to social movements, for
example, is William Gamson's. According to Gamson, social move-
ments succeed when the government provides tangible benefits to
their members that meet the movement's demands, or when it for-
mally accepts the movement as a valid representative of its members'
interests. In the confrontation between the government and a social
movement, he continues, there are four possible outcomes: complete
success; co-optation, where the government formally accepts the
movement but provides no benefits; preemption, where the govern-
ment provides the benefits but fails to accept the movement; and
complete failure, where neither acceptance nor benefits are forthcom-
ing.
179
The concepts of co-optation and preemption represent a useful
beginning in analyzing the way public officials interact with social
movements. In pursuing this important line of inquiry, legal scholar-
ship may have something to teach social movements theory, and
something to contribute to any collaborative effort. Legal scholars
recognize that government is not a single actor, but a complex array
of mutually supporting and conflicting institutions. What may look
179 GAMSON, supra note 22. For other discussions of the relationship between state
officials and social movements in the social movements literature, see, for example, J.
Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements
(1946-1972), 42 AM. Soc. REv. 249 (1977); McCarthy & Wolfson, supra note 61, at 273;
and Tarrow, supra note 61.
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like co-optation and preemption, when viewed from afar, turns out to
be a process of compromise and accommodation, with real interests
that are opposed to social movements, and that also have a claim on
public decision makers. Moreover, the effort by legal scholars to find
logic and reasoning in law is not at all misplaced once they free them-
selves of the expectation that these are the only things that one can or
should find there. Although the structure of the law is largely built by
politics, it is a structure nonetheless, and must possess a certain intel-
lectual coherence if it is to function effectively. The recognition of
human rights may be won by the activism of social movements, but
this victory must be secured by the development of legal concepts that
can be understood and used by public decision makers. Further, this
work must be accomplished inside the courthouse, legislature, or
agency door. While the process may have some elements of co-
optation and preemption, it has other elements that reflect sustained
efforts to incorporate new norms into the ongoing structure of the le-
gal system.
The social construction of legal concepts can be combined with
descriptive and prescriptive aspects of legal scholarship to suggest one
further advantage of integrating that scholarship with the social
movements literature. There is a tendency, in legal scholarship as in
moral philosophy, to treat our deeply felt values as transcultural enti-
ties, as principles that gain dignity from being always true, or always
present, although differentially perceived by different cultures. But
this does not dignify these values; it demeans them. Social movements
literature emphasizes that the ideas and values we care about most-
equality, free speech, religious freedom, due process, the prohibition
of slavery and torture-were fought for, bled for, and died for.180
They are the glories of our current civilization, not because we possess
the pallid virtue of perceiving these principles as they float about in
some sort of transcendental nimbus, but because we possess the efful-
gent virtue of maintaining and re-creating them amid the chaos and
danger of ongoing circumstances. Social movements literature alerts
us to this process. In doing so, and in emphasizing the socially con-
structed character of legal concepts, it not only provides legal scholars
with more accurate perspectives, but also reveals to them their own
role in advancing our most treasured values.
180 See, e.g., MCADAM, supra note 16 (tracing the history of black insurgency);
MoRRIS, supra note 16 (discussing the challenges faced in the civil rights movement);
McAdam, supra note 59 (examining the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer project,
which McAdam labels as "high risk/cost" activism).
2001]
* * * * * *
